A
TREATISE
Concerning the
PRINCIPLES
OF
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

INTRODUCTION.

I. PHILOSOPHY being nothing elſe but the ſtudy of Wiſdom and Truth, it may with reaſon be expected, that thoſe who have ſpent moſt Time and Pains in it ſhould enjoy a greater calm and ſerenity of Mind, a greater clearneſs and evidence of Knowledge, and be leſs diſturbed with Doubts and Difficulties than other Men. Yet ſo it is we ſee the Illiterate Bulk of Mankind that walk the High-road of plain, common Senſe, and are governed by the Dictates of Nature, for the moſt part eaſy and undiſturbed. To them nothing that’s familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of Evidence in their Senſes, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no ſooner do we depart from Senſe and Inſtinct to follow the Light of a Superior Principle, to reaſon, meditate, and reflect on the Nature of Things, but a thouſand Scruples ſpring up in our Minds, concerning thoſe Things which before we ſeemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and Errors of Senſe do from all Parts diſcover themſelves to our view; and endeavouring to correct theſe by Reaſon we are inſenſibly drawn into uncouth Paradoxes, Difficulties, and Inconſiſtences, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in Speculation; till at length, having wander’d through many intricate Mazes, we find our ſelves juſt where we were, or, which is worſe, ſit down in a forlorn Scepticiſm.

II. The cauſe of this is thought to be the Obſcurity of things, or the natural Weakneſs and Imperfection of our Underſtandings. It is ſaid the Faculties we have are few, and thoſe deſigned by Nature for the Support and Comfort of Life, and not to penetrate into the inward Eſſence and Conſtitution of Things. Beſides, the Mind of Man being Finite, when it treats of Things which partake of Infinity, it is not to be wondered at, if it run into Abſurdities and Contradictions; out of which it is impoſſible it ſhould ever extricate it ſelf, it being of the nature of Infinite not to be comprehended by that which is Finite.

III. But perhaps we may be too partial to our ſelves in placing the Fault originally in our Faculties, and not rather in the wrong uſe we make of them. It is a hard thing to ſuppoſe, that right Deductions from true Principles ſhould ever end in Conſequences which cannot be maintained or made conſiſtent. We ſhould believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the Sons of Men, than to give them a ſtrong deſire for that Knowledge, which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted, indulgent Methods of Providence, which, whatever Appetites it may have implanted in the Creatures, doth uſually furniſh them with ſuch means as, if rightly made uſe of, will not fail to ſatisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater Part, if not all, of thoſe Difficulties which have hitherto amus’d Philoſophers, and block’d up the way to Knowledge, are intirely owing to our ſelves. That we have firſt rais’d a Duſt, and then complain, we cannot ſee.

IV. My Purpoſe therefore is, to try if I can diſcover what thoſe Principles are, which have introduced all that Doubtfulneſs and Uncertainty, thoſe Abſurdities and Contradictions into the ſeveral Sects of Philoſophy; inſomuch that the Wiſeſt Men have thought our Ignorance incurable, conceiving it to ariſe from the natural dulneſs and limitation of our Faculties. And ſurely it is a Work well deſerving our Pains, to make a ſtrict inquiry concerning the firſt Principles of Humane Knowledge, to ſift and examine them on all ſides: eſpecially ſince there may be ſome Grounds to ſuſpect that thoſe Lets and Difficulties, which ſtay and embaraſs the Mind in its ſearch after Truth, do not ſpring from any Darkneſs and Intricacy in the Objects, or natural Defect in the Underſtanding, ſo much as from falſe Principles which have been inſiſted on, and might have been avoided.

V. How difficult and diſcouraging ſoever this Attempt may ſeem, when I conſider how many great and extraordinary Men have gone before me in the ſame Deſigns: Yet I am not without ſome Hopes, upon the Conſideration that the largeſt Views are not always the Cleareſt, and that he who is Short-ſighted will be obliged to draw the Object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a cloſe and narrow Survey diſcern that which had eſcaped far better Eyes.

VI. In order to prepare the Mind of the Reader for the eaſier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premiſe ſomewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the Nature and Abuſe of Language. But the unraveling this Matter leads me in ſome meaſure to anticipate my Deſign, by taking notice of what ſeems to have had a chief part in rendering Speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occaſioned innumerable Errors and Difficulties in almoſt all parts of Knowledge. And that is the opinion that the Mind hath a power of framing Abſtract Ideas or Notions of Things. He who is not a perfect Stranger to the Writings and Diſputes of Philoſophers, muſt needs acknowledge that no ſmall part of them are ſpent about abſtract Ideas. Theſe are in a more eſpecial manner, thought to be the Object of thoſe Sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphyſics, and of all that which paſſes under the Notion of the moſt abſtracted and ſublime Learning, in all which one ſhall ſcarce find any Queſtion handled in ſuch a manner, as does not ſuppoſe their Exiſtence in the Mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

VII. It is agreed on all hands, that the Qualities or Modes of things do never really exiſt each of them apart by it ſelf, and ſeparated from all others, but are mix’d, as it were, and blended together, ſeveral in the ſame Object. But we are told, the Mind being able to conſider each Quality ſingly, or abſtracted from thoſe other Qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to it ſelf abſtract Ideas. For example, there is perceived by Sight an Object extended, coloured, and moved: This mix’d or compound Idea the mind reſolving into its Simple, conſtituent Parts, and viewing each by it ſelf, excluſive of the reſt, does frame the abſtract Ideas of Extenſion, Colour, and Motion. Not that it is poſſible for Colour or Motion to exiſt without Extenſion: but only that the Mind can frame to it ſelf by Abſtraction the Idea of Colour excluſive of Extenſion, and of Motion excluſive of both Colour and Extenſion.

VIII. Again, the Mind having obſerved that in the particular Extenſions perceiv’d by Senſe, there is ſomething common and alike in all, and ſome other things peculiar, as this or that Figure or Magnitude, which diſtinguiſh them one from another; it conſiders apart or ſingles out by it ſelf that which is common, making thereof a moſt abſtract Idea of Extenſion, which is neither Line, Surface, nor Solid, nor has any Figure or Magnitude but is an Idea intirely preſcinded from all theſe. So likewiſe the Mind by leaving out of the particular Colours perceived by Senſe, that which diſtinguiſhes them one from another, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an Idea of Colour in abſtract which is neither Red, nor Blue, nor White, nor any other determinate Colour. And in like manner by conſidering Motion abſtractedly not only from the Body moved, but likewiſe from the Figure it deſcribes, and all particular Directions and Velocities, the abſtract Idea of Motion is framed; which equally correſponds to all particular Motions whatſoever that may be perceived by Senſe.

IX. And as the Mind frames to it ſelf abſtract Ideas of Qualites or Modes, ſo does it, by the ſame preciſion or mental Separation, attain abſtract Ideas of the more compounded Beings, which include ſeveral coexiſtent Qualities. For example, the Mind having obſerved that Peter, James, and John, reſemble each other, in certain common Agreements of Shape and other Qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded Idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular Man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all; and ſo makes an abſtract Idea wherein all the particulars equally partake, abſtracting intirely from and cutting off all thoſe Circumſtances and Differences, which might determine it to any particular Exiſtence: And after this manner it is ſaid we come by the abſtract Idea of Man or, if you pleaſe, Humanity or Humane Nature; wherein it is true there is included Colour, becauſe there is no Man but has ſome Colour, but then it can be neither White, nor Black, nor any particular Colour; becauſe the is no one particular Colour wherein all Men partake. So likewiſe there is included Stature, but then it is neither Tall Stature nor Low Stature, nor yet Middle Stature, but ſomething abſtracted from all theſe. And ſo of the reſt. Moreover, there being a great variety of other Creatures that partake in ſome Parts, but not all, of the complex Idea of Man, the Mind leaving out thoſe Parts which are peculiar to Men, and retaining thoſe only which are common to all the living Creatures, frameth the Idea of Animal, which abſtracts not only from all particular Men, but alſo all Birds, Beaſts, Fiſhes, and Inſects. The conſtituent Parts of the abſtract Idea of Animal are Body, Life, Senſe, and Spontaneous Motion. By Body is meant, Body without any particular Shape or Figure, there being no one Shape or Figure common to all Animals, without Covering, either of Hair or Feathers, or Scales, &c. nor yet Naked: Hair, Feathers, Scales, and Nakedneſs being the diſtinguiſhing Properties of particular Animals, and for that reaſon left out of the Abſtract Idea. Upon the ſame account the ſpontaneous Motion muſt be neither Walking, nor Flying, nor Creeping, it is nevertheleſs a Motion, but what that Motion is, it is not eaſy to conceive.

X. Whether others have this wonderful Faculty of Abſtracting their Ideas, they beſt can tell: For my ſelf I find indeed I have a Faculty of imagining, or repreſenting to myſelf the Ideas of thoſe particular things I have perceived and of variouſly compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a Man with Two Heads or the upper parts of a Man joined to the Body of a Horſe. I can conſider the Hand, the Eye, the Noſe, each by it ſelf abſtracted or ſeparated from the reſt of the Body. But then whatever Hand or Eye I imagine, it muſt have ſome particular Shape and Colour. Likewiſe the Idea of Man that I frame to my ſelf, muſt be either of a White, or a Black, or a Tawny, a Straight, or a Crooked, a Tall, or a Low, or a Middle-ſized Man. I cannot by any effort of Thought conceive the abſtract Idea above deſcribed. And it is equally impoſſible for me to form the abſtract Idea of Motion diſtinct from the Body moving, and which is neither Swift nor Slow, Curvilinear nor Rectilinear; and the like may be ſaid of all other abſtract general Ideas whatſoever. To be plain, I own my ſelf able to abſtract in one Senſe, as when I conſider ſome particular Parts or Qualities ſeparated from others, with which though they are united in ſome Object, yet, it is poſſible they may really Exiſt without them. But I deny that I can abſtract one from another, or conceive ſeparately, thoſe Qualities which it is impoſſible ſhould Exiſt ſo ſeparated; or that I can frame a General Notion by aſtracting from Particulars in the manner aforeſaid. Which two laſt are the proper Acceptations of Abſtraction. And there are Grounds to think moſt Men will acknowledge themſelves to be in my Caſe. The Generality of Men which are Simple and Illiterate never pretend to abſtract Notions. It is ſaid they are difficult and not to be attained without Pains and Study. We may therefore reaſonably conclude that, if ſuch there be, they are confined only to the Learned.

XI. I proceed to examine what can be alledged in defence of the Doctrine of Abſtraction, and try if I can diſcover what it is that inclines the Men of Speculation to embrace an Opinion, ſo remote from common Senſe as that ſeems to be. There has been a late deſervedly Eſteemed Philoſopher, who, no doubt, has given it very much Countenance by ſeeming to think the having abſtract general Ideas is what puts the wideſt difference in point of Underſtanding betwixt Man and Beaſt. “ The having of general Ideas (ſaith he) is that which puts a perfect diſtinction betwixt Man and Brutes, and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evident we obſerve no Footſteps in them of making uſe of general Signs for univerſal Ideas; from which we have reaſon to imagine that they have not the Faculty of abſtracting or making general Ideas, ſince they have no uſe of Words or any other general Signs. And a little after. Therefore, I think, we may ſuppoſe that it is in this that the Species of Brutes are diſcriminated from Men, and ’tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly ſeparated, and which at laſt widens to ſo wide a Diſtance. For if they have any Ideas at all, and are not bare Machines (as ſome would have them) we cannot deny them to have ſome Reaſon. It ſeems as evident to me that they do ſome of them in certain Inſtances reaſon as that they have Senſe, but it is only in particular Ideas, juſt as they receive them from their Senſes. They are the beſt of them tied up within thoſe narrow Bounds, and have not (as I think) the Faculty to enlarge them by any kind of Abſtraction.” Eſſay on Hum. Underſt. B. 2. C. 11. Sect. 10 and 11. I readily agree with this Learned Author, that the Faculties of Brutes can by no means attain to Abſtraction. But then if this be made the diſtinguiſhing property of that ſort of Animals, I fear a great many of thoſe that paſs for Men muſt be reckoned into their number. The reaſon that is here aſſigned why we have no Grounds to think Brutes have Abſtract general Ideas, is that we obſerve in them no uſe of Words or any other general Signs; which is built on this Suppoſition, to wit, that the making uſe of Words, implies the having general Ideas. From which it follows, that Men who uſe Language are able to Abſtract or Generalize their Ideas. That this is the Senſe and Arguing of the Author will further appear by his anſwering the Queſtion he in another place puts. “ Since all things that exiſt are only Particulars, how come we by general Terms? His Anſwer is, Words become general by being made the Signs of general Ideas.” Eſſay on Hum. Underſt. B. 3. C. 3. Sect. 6. But it ſeems that a Word becomes general by being made the Sign, not of an abſtract general Idea but, of ſeveral particular Ideas, any one of which it indifferently ſuggeſts to the Mind. For Example, When it is ſaid the change of Motion is proportional to the impreſſed force, or that whatever has Extenſion is diviſible; theſe Propoſitions are to be underſtood of Motion and Extenſion in general, and nevertheleſs it will not follow that they ſuggeſt to my Thoughts an Idea of Motion without a Body moved, or any determinate Direction and Velocity, or that I muſt conceive an abſtract general Idea of Extenſion, which is neither Line, Surface nor Solid, neither Great nor Small, Black, White, nor Red, nor of any other determinate Colour. It is only implied that whatever Motion I conſider, whether it be Swift or Slow, Perpendicular, Horizontal or Oblique, or in whatever Object, the Axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular Extenſion, it matters not whether Line, Surface or Solid, whether of this or that Magnitude or Figure.

XII. By obſerving how Ideas become general, we may the better judge how Words are made ſo. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny abſolutely there are general Ideas, but only that there are any abſtract general Ideas: For in the Paſſages above quoted, wherein there is mention of general Ideas, it is always ſuppoſed that they are formed by Abſtraction, after the manner ſet forth in Sect. VIII and IX. Now if we will annex a meaning to our Words, and ſpeak only of what we can conceive, I believe we ſhall acknowledge, that an Idea, which conſidered in it ſelf is particular, becomes general, by being made to repreſent or ſtand for all other particular Ideas of the ſame ſort. To make this plain by an Example, ſuppoſe a Geometrician is demonſtrating the Method, of cutting a Line in two equal Parts. He draws, for Inſtance, a Black Line of an Inch in Length, this which in it ſelf is a particular Line is nevertheleſs with regard to its ſignification General, ſince as it is there uſed, it repreſents all particular Lines whatſoever; ſo that what is demonſtrated of it, is demonſtrated of all Lines, or, in other Words, of a Line in General. And as that particular Line becomes General, by being made a Sign, ſo the name Line which taken abſolutely is particular, by being a Sign is made General. And as the former owes its Generality, not to its being the Sign of an abſtract or general Line, but of all particular right Lines that may poſſibly exiſt, ſo the latter muſt be thought to derive its Generality from the ſame Cauſe, namely, the various particular Lines which it indifferently denotes.

XIII. To give the Reader a yet clearer View of the Nature of abſtract Ideas, and the Uſes they are thought neceſſary to, I ſhall add one more Paſſage out of the Eſſay on Human Underſtanding, which is as follows. “ Abſtract Ideas are not ſo obvious or eaſy to Children or the yet unexerciſed Mind as particular ones. If they ſeem ſo to grown Men, it is only becauſe by conſtant and familiar Uſe they are made ſo. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we ſhall find that general Ideas are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry Difficulty with them, and do not ſo eaſily offer themſelves, as we are apt to imagine. For Example, Does it not require ſome Pains and Skill to form the general Idea of a Triangle (which is yet none of the moſt abſtract comprehenſive and difficult) for it muſt be neither Oblique nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon, but all and none of theſe at once. In effect, it is ſomething imperfect that cannot exiſt, an Idea wherein ſome Parts of ſeveral different and inconſiſtent Ideas are put together. It is true the Mind in this imperfect State has need of ſuch Ideas, and makes all the haſte to them it can, for the conveniency of Communication and Enlargement of Knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reaſon to ſuſpect ſuch Ideas are Marks of our Imperfection. At leaſt this is enough to ſhew that the moſt abſtract and general Ideas are not thoſe that the Mind is firſt and moſt eaſily acquainted with, nor ſuch as its earlieſt Knowledge is converſant about. B. 4. C. 7. Sect. 9.” If any Man has the Faculty of framing in his Mind ſuch an Idea of a Triangle as is here deſcribed, it is in vain to pretend to diſpute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I deſire is, that the Reader would fully and certainly inform himſelf whether he has ſuch an Idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard Task for any one to perform. What more eaſy than for any one to look a little into his own Thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an Idea that ſhall correſpond with the deſcription that is here given of the general Idea of a Triangle, which is, neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon, but all and none of theſe at once?

XIV. Much is here ſaid of the Difficulty that abſtract Ideas carry with them, and the Pains and Skill requiſite to the forming them. And it is on all Hands agreed that there is need of great Toil and Labour of the Mind, to emancipate our Thoughts from particular Objects, and raiſe them to thoſe ſublime Speculations that are converſant about abſtract Ideas. From all which the natural Conſequence ſhould ſeem to be, that ſo difficult a thing as the forming abſtract Ideas was not neceſſary for Communication, which is ſo eaſy and familiar to all ſorts of Men. But we are told, if they ſeem obvious and eaſy to grown Men, It is only becauſe by conſtant and familiar uſe they are made ſo. Now I would fain know at what time it is, Men are imployed in ſurmounting that Difficulty, and furniſhing themſelves with thoſe neceſſary helps for Diſcourſe. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it ſeems they are not conſcious of any ſuch Pains-taking; it remains therefore to be the buſineſs of their Childhood. And ſurely, the great and multiplied Labour of framing abſtract Notions, will be found a hard Task for that tender Age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine, that a couple of Children cannot prate together, of their Sugar-plumbs and Rattles and the reſt of their little Trinkets, till they have firſt tacked together numberleſs Inconſiſtencies, and ſo framed in their Minds abſtract general Ideas, and annexed them to every common Name they make uſe of?

XV. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the Enlargement of Knowledge than for Communication. It is I know a Point much inſiſted on, that all Knowledge and Demonſtration are about univerſal Notions, to which I fully agree: But then it doth not appear to me that thoſe Notions are formed by Abſtraction in the manner premiſed; Univerſality, ſo far as I can comprehend, not conſiſting in the abſolute, poſitive Nature or Conception of any thing, but in the relation it bears to the Particulars ſignified or repreſented by it: By virtue whereof it is that Things, Names, or Notions, being in their own Nature Particular, are rendered Univerſal. Thus when I demonſtrate any Propoſition concerning Triangles, it is to be ſuppoſed that I have in view the univerſal Idea of a Triangle; which ought not to be underſtood as if I could frame an Idea of a Triangle which was neither Equilateral nor Scalenon nor Equicrural. But only that the particular Triangle I conſider, whether of this or that ſort it matters not, doth equally ſtand for and repreſent all Rectilinear Triangles whatſoever, and is in that ſenſe Univerſal. All which ſeems very Plain and not to include any Difficulty in it.

XVI But here it will be demanded, how we can know any Propoſition to be true of all particular Triangles, except we have firſt ſeen it demonſtrated of the abſtract Idea of a Triangle which equally agrees to all? For becauſe a Property may be demonſtrated to agree to ſome one particular Triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to any other Triangle, which in all reſpects is not the ſame with it. For Example, Having demonſtrated that the three Angles of an Iſoſceles Rectangular Triangle are equal to two right Ones, I cannot therefore conclude this Affection agrees to all other Triangles, which have neither a right Angle, nor two equal Sides. It ſeems therefore that, to be certain this Propoſition is univerſally true, we muſt either make a particular Demonſtration for every particular Triangle, which is impoſſible, or once for all demonſtrate it of the abſtract Idea of a Triangle, in which all the Particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all equally repreſented. To which I anſwer, that though the Idea I have in view whilſt I make the Demonſtration, be, for inſtance, that of an Iſoſceles Rectangular Triangle, whoſe Sides are of a determinate Length, I may nevertheleſs be certain it extends to all other Rectilinear Triangles, of what Sort or Bigneſs ſoever. And that, becauſe neither the right Angle, nor the Equality, nor determinate Length of the Sides, are at all concerned in the Demonſtration. It is true, the Diagram I have in view includes all theſe Particulars, but then there is not the leaſt mention made of them in the Proof of the Propoſition. It is not ſaid, the three Angles are equal to two right Ones, becauſe one of them is a right Angle, or becauſe the Sides comprehending it are of the ſame Length. Which ſufficiently ſhews that the right Angle might have been Oblique, and the Sides unequal, and for all that the Demonſtration have held good. And for this reaſon it is, that I conclude that to be true of any Obliquangular or Scalenon, which I had demonſtrated of a particular Right-angled, Equicrural Triangle; and not becauſe I demonſtrated the Propoſition of the abſtract Idea of a Triangle. And here it muſt be acknowledged that a Man may conſider a Figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular Qualities of the Angles, or relations of the Sides. So far he may abſtract: But this will never prove, that he can frame an abſtract general inconſiſtent Idea of a Triangle. In like manner we may conſider Peter ſo far forth as Man, or ſo far forth as Animal, without framing the forementioned abſtract Idea, either of Man or of Animal, in as much as all that is perceived is not conſidered.

XVII. It were an endleſs, as well as an uſeleſs Thing, to trace the Schoolmen, thoſe great Maſters of Abſtraction, through all the manifold inextricable Labyrinths of Error and Diſpute, which their Doctrine of abſtract Natures and Notions ſeems to have led them into. What Bickerings and Controverſies, and what a learned Duſt have been raiſed about thoſe Matters, and what mighty Advantage hath been from thence derived to Mankind, are things at this Day too clearly known to need being inſiſted on. And it had been well if the ill Effects of that Doctrine were confined to thoſe only who make the moſt avowed Profeſſion of it. When Men conſider the great Pains, Induſtry and Parts, that have for ſo many Ages been laid out on the Cultivation and Advancement of the Sciences, and that notwithſtanding all this, the far greater Part of them remain full of Darkneſs and Uncertainty, and Diſputes that are like never to have an end, and even thoſe that are thought to be ſupported by the moſt clear and cogent Demonſtrations, contain in them Paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the Underſtandings of Men, and that taking all together, a ſmall Portion of them doth ſupply any real Benefit to Mankind, otherwiſe than by being an innocent Diverſion and Amuſement: I ſay, the Conſideration of all this is apt to throw them into a Deſpondency, and perfect Contempt of all Study. But this may perhaps ceaſe, upon a view of the falſe Principles that have obtained in the World, amongſt all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide Influence over the Thoughts of Speculative Men, than this of abſtract general Ideas.

XVIII. I come now to conſider the Source of this prevailing Notion, and that ſeems to me to be Language. And ſurely nothing of leſs extent than Reaſon it ſelf could have been the Source of an Opinion ſo univerſally received. The truth of this appears as from other Reaſons, ſo alſo from the plain Confeſſion of the ableſt Patrons of abſtract Ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear Conſequence, that if there had been no ſuch thing as Speech or Univerſal Signs, there never had been any thought of Abſtraction. See B. 3. C. 6. Sect. 39. and elſewhere of the Eſſay on Human Underſtanding. Let us therefore examine the manner wherein Words have contributed to the Origin of that Miſtake. Firſt then, ’Tis thought that every Name hath, or ought to have, one only preciſe and ſettled Signification, which inclines Men to think there are certain abſtract, determinate Ideas, which conſtitute the true and only immediate Signification of each general Name. And that it is by the mediation of theſe abſtract Ideas, that a general Name comes to ſignify any particular Thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no ſuch thing as one preciſe and definite Signification annexed to any general Name, they all ſignifying indifferently a great number of particular Ideas. All which doth evidently follow from what has been already ſaid, and will clearly appear to any one by a little Reflexion. To this it will be objected, that every Name that has a Definition, is thereby reſtrained to one certain Signification. For Example, a Triangle is defined to be a plain Surface comprehended by three right Lines; by which that Name is limited to denote one certain Idea and no other. To which I anſwer, that in the Definition it is not ſaid whether the Surface be Great or Small, Black or White, nor whether the Sides are Long or Short, Equal or Unequal, nor with what Angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may be great Variety, and conſequently there is no one ſettled Idea which limits the Signification of the word Triangle. ’Tis one thing for to keep a Name conſtantly to the ſame Definition, and another to make it ſtand every where for the ſame Idea: the one is neceſſary, the other uſeleſs and impracticable.

XIX. But to give a farther Account how Words came to produce the Doctrine of abſtract Ideas, it muſt be obſerved that it is a received Opinion, that Language has no other End but the communicating our Ideas, and that every ſignificant Name ſtands for an Idea. This being ſo, and it being withal certain, that Names, which yet are not thought altogether inſignificant, do not always mark out particular conceivable Ideas, it is ſtraightway concluded that they ſtand for abſtract Notions. That there are many Names in uſe amongſt Speculative Men, which do not always ſuggeſt to others determinate particular Ideas, is what no Body will deny. And a little Attention will diſcover, that it is not neceſſary (even in the ſtricteſt Reaſonings) ſignificant Names which ſtand for Ideas ſhould, every time they are uſed, excite in the Underſtanding the Ideas they are made to ſtand for: In Reading and Diſcourſing, Names being for the moſt part uſed as Letters are in Algebra, in which though a particular quantity be marked by each Letter, yet to proceed right it is not requiſite that in every ſtep each Letter ſuggeſt to your Thoughts, that particular quantity it was appointed to ſtand for.

XX. Beſides, the communicating of Ideas marked by Words is not the chief and only end of Language, as is commonly ſuppoſed. There are other Ends, as the raiſing of ſome Paſſion, the exciting to, or deterring from an Action, the putting the Mind in ſome particular Diſpoſition; to which the former is in many Caſes barely ſubſervient, and ſometimes intirely omitted, when theſe can be obtained without it, as I think doth not infrequently happen in the familiar uſe of Language. I intreat the Reader to reflect with himſelf, and ſee if it doth not often happen either in Hearing or Reading a Diſcourſe, that the Paſſions of Fear, Love, Hatred, Admiration, Diſdain, and the like, ariſe immediately in his Mind upon the Perception of certain Words, without any Ideas coming between. At firſt, indeed, the Words might have occaſioned Ideas that were fit to produce thoſe Emotions; but, if I miſtake not, it will be found that when Language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the Sounds or Sight of the Characters is oft immediately attended with thoſe Paſſions, which at firſt were wont to be produced by the intervention of Ideas, that are now quite omitted. May we not, for Example, be affected with the promiſe of a good Thing, though we have not an Idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatned with Danger ſufficient to excite a Dread, though we think not of any particular Evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to our ſelves an Idea of Danger in Abſtract? If any one ſhall join ever ſo little Reflexion of his own to what has been ſaid, I believe it will evidently appear to him, that general Names are often uſed in the propriety of Language without the Speaker’s deſigning them for Marks of Ideas in his own, which he would have them raiſe in the Mind of the Hearer. Even proper Names themſelves do not ſeem always ſpoken, with a Deſign to bring into our view the Ideas of thoſe Individuals that are ſuppoſed to be marked by them. For Example, when a Schoolman tells me Ariſtotle hath ſaid it, all I conceive he means by it, is to diſpoſe me to embrace his Opinion with the Deference and Submiſſion which Cuſtom has annexed to that Name. And this effect may be ſo inſtantly produced in the Minds of thoſe who are accuſtomed to reſign their Judgment to the Authority of that Philoſopher, as it is impoſſible any Idea either of his Perſon, Writings, or Reputation ſhould go before. Innumerable Examples of this kind may be given, but why ſhould I inſiſt on thoſe things, which every one’s Experience will, I doubt not, plentifully ſuggeſt unto him?

XXI. We have, I think, ſhewn the Impoſſibility of abſtract Ideas. We have conſidered what has been ſaid for them by their ableſt Patrons; and endeavoured to ſhew they are of no Uſe for thoſe Ends, to which they are thought neceſſary. And laſtly, we have traced them to the Source from whence they flow, which appears to be Language. It cannot be denied that Words are of excellent Uſe, in that by their means all that Stock of Knowledge which has been purchaſed by the joint Labours of inquiſitive Men in all Ages and Nations, may be drawn into the view and made the poſſeſſion of one ſingle Perſon. But at the ſame time it muſt be owned that moſt parts of Knowledge have been ſtrangely perplexed and darkened by the abuſe of Words, and general ways of Speech wherein they are delivered. Since therefore Words are ſo apt to impoſe on the Underſtanding, whatever Ideas I conſider, I ſhall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my View, keeping out of my Thoughts, ſo far as I am able, thoſe Names which long and conſtant Uſe hath ſo ſtrictly united with them; from which I may expect to derive the following Advantages.

XXII. Firſt, I ſhall be ſure to get clear of all Controverſies purely Verbal; the ſpringing up of which Weeds in almoſt all the Sciences has been a main Hindrance to the Growth of true and ſound Knowledge. Secondly, this ſeems to be a ſure way to extricate my ſelf out of that fine and ſubtile Net of abſtract Ideas, which has ſo miſerably perplexed and entangled the Minds of Men, and that with this peculiar Circumſtance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the Wit of any Man, by ſo much the deeper was he like to be enſnared, and faſter held therein. Thirdly, ſo long as I confine my Thoughts to my own Ideas diveſted of Words, I do not ſee how I can eaſily be miſtaken. The Objects I conſider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an Idea which I have not. It is not poſſible for me to imagine, that any of my own Ideas are alike or unlike, that are not truly ſo. To diſcern the Agreements or Diſagreements there are between my Ideas, to ſee what Ideas are included in any compound Idea, and what not, there is nothing more requiſite, than an attentive Perception of what paſſes in my own Underſtanding.

XXIII. But the attainment of all theſe Advantages doth preſuppoſe an intire Deliverance from the Deception of Words, which I dare hardly promiſe my ſelf; ſo difficult a thing it is to diſſolve an Union ſo early begun, and confirmed by ſo long a Habit as that betwixt Words and Ideas. Which Difficulty ſeems to have been very much increaſed by the Doctrine of Abſtraction. For ſo long as Men thought abſtract Ideas were annexed to their Words, it doth not ſeem ſtrange that they ſhould uſe Words for Ideas: It being found an impracticable thing to lay aſide the Word, and retain the abſtract Idea in the Mind, which in it ſelf was perfectly inconceivable. This ſeems to me the principal Cauſe, why thoſe Men who have ſo emphatically recommended to others, the laying aſide all uſe of Words in their Meditations, and contemplating their bare Ideas, have yet failed to perform it themſelves. Of late many have been very ſenſible of the abſurd Opinions and inſignificant Diſputes, which grow out of the abuſe of Words. And in order to remedy theſe Evils they adviſe well, that we attend to the Ideas ſignified, and draw off our Attention from the Words which ſignify them. But how good ſoever this Advice may be, they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themſelves, ſo long as they thought the only immediate uſe of Words was to ſignify Ideas, and that the immediate Signification of every general Name was a determinate, abſtract Idea.

XXIV. But theſe being known to be Miſtakes; a Man may with greater Eaſe prevent his being impoſed on by Words. He that knows he has no other than particular Ideas, will not puzzle himſelf in vain to find out and conceive the abſtract Idea, annexed to any Name. And he that knows Names do not always ſtand for Ideas, will ſpare himſelf the labour of looking for Ideas, where there are none to be had. It were therefore to be wiſhed that every one would uſe his utmoſt Endeavours, to obtain a clear View of the Ideas he would conſider, ſeparating from them all that dreſs and incumbrance of Words which ſo much contribute to blind the Judgment and divide the Attention. In vain do we extend our View into the Heavens, and pry into the Entrails of the Earth, in vain do we conſult the Writings of learned Men, and trace the dark Footſteps of Antiquity; we need only draw the Curtain of Words, to behold the faireſt Tree of Knowledge, whoſe Fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our Hand.

XXV. Unleſs we take care to clear the firſt Principles of Knowledge, from the embarras and deluſion of Words, we may make infinite Reaſonings upon them to no purpoſe; we may draw Conſequences from Conſequences, and be never the wiſer. The farther we go, we ſhall only loſe our ſelves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in Difficulties and Miſtakes. Whoever therefore deſigns to read the following Sheets, I intreat him to make my Words the Occaſion of his own Thinking, and endeavour to attain the ſame Train of Thoughts in Reading, that I had in writing them. By this means it will be eaſy for him to diſcover the Truth or Falſity of what I ſay. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my Words, and I do not ſee how he can be led into an Error by conſidering his own naked, undiſguiſed Ideas.

OF THE PRINCIPLES OF Humane Knowledge.
PART I.

I. IT is evident to any one who takes a Survey of the Objects of Humane Knowledge, that they are either Ideas actually imprinted on the Senſes, or elſe ſuch as are perceived by attending to the Paſſions and Operations of the Mind, or laſtly Ideas formed by help of Memory and Imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely repreſenting thoſe originally perceived in the aforeſaid ways. By Sight I have the Ideas of Light and Colours with their ſeveral Degrees and Variations. By Touch I perceive, for Example, Hard and Soft, Heat and Cold, Motion and Reſiſtance, and of all theſe more and leſs either as to Quantity or Degree. Smelling furniſhes me with Odors; the Palate with Taſtes, and Hearing conveys Sounds to the Mind in all their variety of Tone and Compoſition. And as ſeveral of theſe are obſerved to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one Name, and ſo to be reputed as one Thing. Thus, for Example, a certain Colour, Taſte, Smell, Figure and Conſiſtence having been obſerved to go together, are accounted one diſtinct Thing, ſignified by the Name Apple. Other Collections of Ideas conſtitute a Stone, a Tree, a Book, and the like ſenſible Things; which, as they are pleaſing or diſagreeable, excite the Paſſions of Love, Hatred, Joy, Grief, and ſo forth.

II. But beſides all that endleſs variety of Ideas or Objects of Knowledge, there is likewiſe ſomething which knows or perceives them, and exerciſes divers Operations, as Willing, Imagining, Remembering about them. This perceiving, active Being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul or my Self. By which Words I do not denote any one of my Ideas, but a thing intirely diſtinct from them, wherein they exiſt, or, which is the ſame thing, whereby they are perceived; for the Exiſtence of an Idea conſiſts in being perceived.

III. That neither our Thoughts, nor Paſſions, nor Ideas formed by the Imagination, exiſt without the Mind, is what every Body will allow. And it ſeems no leſs evident that the various Senſations or Ideas imprinted on the Senſe, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever Objects they compoſe) cannot exiſt otherwiſe than in a Mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive Knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that ſhall attend to what is meant by the Term Exiſt, when applied to ſenſible Things. The Table I write on, I ſay, exiſts, that is, I ſee and feel it; and if I were out of my Study I ſhould ſay it exiſted, meaning thereby that if I was in my Study I might perceive it, or that ſome other Spirit actually does perceive it. There was an Odor, that is, it was ſmelled; There was a Sound, that is to ſay, it was heard; a Colour or Figure, and it was perceived by Sight or Touch. This is all that I can underſtand by theſe and the like Expreſſions. For as to what is ſaid of the abſolute Exiſtence of unthinking Things without any relation to their being perceived, that ſeems perfectly unintelligible. Their Eſſe is Percipi, nor is it poſſible they ſhould have any Exiſtence, out of the Minds or thinking Things which perceive them.

IV. It is indeed an Opinion ſtrangely prevailing amongſt Men, that Houſes, Mountains, Rivers, and in a word all ſenſible Objects have an Exiſtence Natural or Real, diſtinct from their being perceived by the Underſtanding. But with how great an Aſſurance and Acquieſcence ſoever this Principle may be entertained in the World; yet whoever ſhall find in his Heart to call it in Queſtion, may, if I miſtake not, perceive it to involve a manifeſt Contradiction. For what are the forementioned Objects but the things we perceive by Senſe, and what do we perceive beſides our own Ideas or Senſations; and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of theſe or any Combination of them ſhould exiſt unperceived?

V. If we throughly examine this Tenet, it will, perhaps, be found at Bottom to depend on the Doctrine of Abſtract Ideas. For can there be a nicer Strain of Abſtraction than to diſtinguiſh the Exiſtence of ſenſible Objects from their being perceived, ſo as to conceive them Exiſting unperceived? Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Extenſion and Figures, in a word the Things we ſee and feel, what are they but ſo many Senſations, Notions, Ideas or Impreſſions on the Senſe; and is it poſſible to ſeparate, even in thought, any of theſe from Perception? For my part I might as eaſily divide a Thing from it Self. I may indeed divide in my Thoughts or conceive apart from each other thoſe Things which, perhaps, I never perceived by Senſe ſo divided. Thus I imagine the Trunk of a Humane Body without the Limbs, or conceive the Smell of a Roſe without thinking on the Roſe it ſelf. So far I will not deny I can abſtract, if that may properly be called Abſtraction, which extends only to the conceiving ſeparately ſuch Objects, as it is poſſible may really exiſt or be actually perceived aſunder. But my conceiving or imagining Power does not extend beyond the poſſibility of real Exiſtence or Perception. Hence as it is impoſſible for me to ſee or feel any Thing without an actual Senſation of that Thing, ſo is it impoſſible for me to conceive in my Thoughts any ſenſible Thing or Object diſtinct from the Senſation or Perception of it.

VI. Some Truths there are ſo near and obvious to the Mind, that a Man need only open his Eyes to ſee them. Such I take this Important one to be, to wit, that all the Choir of Heaven and Furniture of the Earth, in a word all thoſe Bodies which compoſe the mighty Frame of the World, have not any Subſiſtence without a Mind, that their Being is to be perceived or known; that conſequently ſo long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exiſt in my Mind or that of any other created Spirit, they muſt either have no Exiſtence at all, or elſe ſubſiſt in the Mind of ſome eternal Spirit: It being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the Abſurdity of Abſtraction, to attribute to any ſingle part of them an Exiſtence independent of a Spirit. To be convinced of which, the Reader need only reflect and try to ſeparate in his own Thoughts the being of a ſenſible thing from its being perceived.

VII. From what has been ſaid, it follows, there is not any other Subſtance than Spirit, or that which perceives. But for the fuller proof of this Point, let it be conſidered, the ſenſible Qualities are Colour, Figure, Motion, Smell, Taſte, and ſuch like, that is, the Ideas perceived by Senſe. Now for an Idea to exiſt in an unperceiving Thing, is a manifeſt Contradiction; for to have an Idea is all one as to perceive: that therefore wherein Colour, Figure, and the like Qualities exiſt, muſt perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking Subſtance or Subſtratum of thoſe Ideas.

VIII. But ſay you, though the Ideas themſelves do not exiſt without the Mind, yet there may be Things like them whereof they are Copies or Reſemblances, which Things exiſt without the Mind, in an unthinking Subſtance. I anſwer, an Idea can be like nothing but an Idea; a Colour or Figure can be like nothing but another Colour or Figure. If we look but ever ſo little into our Thoughts, we ſhall find it impoſſible for us to conceive a Likeneſs except only between our Ideas. Again, I ask whether thoſe ſuppoſed Originals or external Things, of which our Ideas are the Pictures or Repreſentations, be themſelves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are Ideas, and we have gained our Point; but if you ſay they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be Senſe, to aſſert a Colour is like ſomething which is inviſible; Hard or Soft, like ſomething which is Intangible; and ſo of the reſt.

IX. Some there are who make a Diſtinction betwixt Primary and Secondary Qualities: By the former, they mean Extenſion, Figure, Motion, Reſt, Solidity or Impenetrability and Number: By the latter they denote all other ſenſible Qualities, as Colours, Sounds, Taſtes, and ſo forth. The Ideas we have of theſe they acknowledge not to be the Reſemblances of any thing exiſting without the Mind or unperceived; but they will have our Ideas of the primary Qualities to be Patterns or Images of Things which exiſt without the Mind, in an unthinking Subſtance which they call Matter. By Matter therefore we are to underſtand an inert, ſenſeleſs Subſtance, in which Extenſion, Figure, and Motion, do actually ſubſiſt. But it is evident from what we have already ſhewn, that Extenſion, Figure and Motion are only Ideas exiſting in the Mind, and that an Idea can be like nothing but another Idea, and that conſequently neither They nor their Archetypes can exiſt in an unperceiving Subſtance. Hence it is plain, that the very Notion of what is called Matter or Corporeal Subſtance, involves a Contradiction in it.

X. They who aſſert that Figure, Motion, and the reſt of the Primary or Original Qualities do exiſt without the Mind, in unthinking Subſtances, do at the ſame time acknowledge that Colours, Sounds, Heat, Cold, and ſuch like ſecondary Qualities, do not, which they tell us are Senſations exiſting in the Mind alone, that depend on and are occaſioned by the different Size, Texture and Motion of the minute Particles of Matter. This they take for an undoubted Truth, which they can demonſtrate beyond all Exception. Now if it be certain, that thoſe original Qualities are inſeparably united with the other ſenſible Qualities, and not, even in Thought, capable of being abſtracted from them, it plainly follows that they exiſt only in the Mind. But I deſire any one to reflect and try, whether he can by any Abſtraction of Thought, conceive the Extenſion and Motion of a Body, without all other ſenſible Qualities. For my own part, I ſee evidently that it is not in my power to frame an Idea of a Body extended and moved, but I muſt withal give it ſome Colour or other ſenſible Quality which is acknowledged to exiſt only in the Mind. In ſhort, Extenſion, Figure, and Motion, abſtracted from all other Qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other ſenſible Qualities are, there muſt theſe be alſo, to wit, in the Mind and no where elſe.

XI. Again, Great and Small, Swift and Slow, are allowed to exiſt no where without the Mind, being intirely relative, and changing as the Frame or Poſition of the Organs of Senſe varies. The Extenſion therefore which exiſts without the Mind, is neither great nor ſmall, the Motion neither ſwift nor ſlow, that is, they are nothing at all. But ſay you, they are Extenſion in general, and Motion in general: Thus we ſee how much the Tenet of extended, moveable Subſtances exiſting without the Mind, depends on that ſtrange Doctrine of abſtract Ideas. And here I cannot but remark, how nearly the Vague and indeterminate Deſcription of Matter or corporeal Subſtance, which the Modern Philoſophers are run into by their own Principles, reſembles that antiquated and ſo much ridiculed Notion of Materia prima, to be met with in Ariſtotle and his Followers. Without Extenſion Solidity cannot be conceived; ſince therefore it has been ſhewn that Extenſion exiſts not in an unthinking Subſtance, the ſame muſt alſo be true of Solidity.

XII. That Number is intirely the Creature of the Mind, even though the other Qualities be allowed to exiſt without, will be evident to whoever conſiders, that the ſame thing bears a different Denomination of Number, as the Mind views it with different reſpects. Thus, the ſame Extenſion is One or Three or Thirty Six, according as the Mind conſiders it with reference to a Yard, a Foot, or an Inch. Number is ſo viſibly relative, and dependent on Mens Underſtanding, that it is ſtrange to think how any one ſhould give it an abſolute Exiſtence without the Mind. We ſay one Book, one Page, one Line; all theſe are equally Unites, though ſome contain ſeveral of the others. And in each Inſtance it is plain, the Unite relates to ſome particular Combination of Ideas arbitrarily put together by the Mind.

XIII. Unity I know ſome will have to be a ſimple or uncompounded Idea, accompanying all other Ideas into the Mind. That I have any ſuch Idea anſwering the Word Unity, I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miſs finding it; on the contrary it ſhould be the moſt familiar to my Underſtanding, ſince it is ſaid to accompany all other Ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of Senſation and Reflexion. To ſay no more, it is an abſtract Idea.

XIV. I ſhall farther add, that after the ſame manner, as modern Philoſophers prove certain ſenſible Qualities to have no Exiſtence in Matter, or without the Mind, the ſame thing may be likewiſe proved of all other ſenſible Qualities whatſoever. Thus, for Inſtance, it is ſaid that Heat and Cold are Affections only of the Mind, and not at all Patterns of real Beings, exiſting in the corporeal Subſtances which excite them, for that the ſame Body which appears Cold to one Hand, ſeems Warm to another. Now why may we not as well argue that Figure and Extenſion are not Patterns or Reſemblances of Qualities exiſting in Matter, becauſe to the ſame Eye at different Stations, or Eyes of a different Texture at the ſame Station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the Images of any thing ſettled and determinate without the Mind? Again, It is proved that Sweetneſs is not really in the ſapid Thing, becauſe the thing remaining unaltered the Sweetneſs is changed into Bitter, as in caſe of a Fever or otherwiſe vitiated Palate. Is it not as reaſonable to ſay, that Motion is not without the Mind, ſince if the Succeſſion of Ideas in the Mind become ſwifter, the Motion, it is acknowledged, ſhall appear ſlower without any Alteration in any external Object.

XV. In ſhort, let any one conſider thoſe Arguments, which are thought manifeſtly to prove that Colours and Taſtes exiſt only in the Mind, and he ſhall find they may with equal force, be brought to prove the ſame thing of Extenſion, Figure, and Motion. Though it muſt be confeſſed this Method of arguing doth not ſo much prove that there is no Extenſion or Colour in an outward Object, as that we do not know by Senſe which is the true Extenſion or Colour of the Object. But the Arguments foregoing plainly ſhew it to be impoſſible that any Colour or Extenſion at all, or other ſenſible Quality whatſoever, ſhould exiſt in an unthinking Subject without the Mind, or in truth, that there ſhould be any ſuch thing as an outward Object.

XVI. But let us examine a little the received Opinion. It is ſaid Extenſion is a Mode or Accident of Matter, and that Matter is the Subſtratum that ſupports it. Now I deſire that you would explain what is meant by Matter’s ſupporting Extenſion: Say you, I have no Idea of Matter, and therefore cannot explain it. I anſwer, though you have no poſitive, yet if you have any meaning at all, you muſt at leaſt have a relative Idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you muſt be ſuppoſed to know what Relation it bears to Accidents, and what is meant by its ſupporting them. It is evident Support cannot here be taken in its uſual or literal Senſe, as when we ſay that Pillars ſupport a Building: In what Senſe therefore muſt it be taken?

XVII. If we inquire into what the moſt accurate Philoſophers declare themſelves to mean by Material Subſtance; we ſhall find them acknowledge, they have no other meaning annexed to thoſe Sounds, but the Idea of Being in general, together with the relative Notion of its ſupporting Accidents. The general Idea of Being appeareth to me the moſt abſtract and incomprehenſible of all other; and as for its ſupporting Accidents, this, as we have juſt now obſerved, cannot be underſtood in the common Senſe of thoſe Words; it muſt therefore be taken in ſome other Senſe, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I conſider the two Parts or Branches which make the ſignification of the Words Material Subſtance, I am convinced there is no diſtinct meaning annexed to them. But why ſhould we trouble our ſelves any farther, in diſcuſſing this Material Subſtratum or Support of Figure and Motion, and other ſenſible Qualities? Does it not ſuppoſe they have an Exiſtence without the Mind? And is not this a direct Repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?

XVIII. But though it were poſſible that ſolid, figured, moveable Subſtances may exiſt without the Mind, correſponding to the Ideas we have of Bodies, yet how is it poſſible for us to know this? Either we muſt know it by Senſe, or by Reaſon. As for our Senſes, by them we have the Knowledge only of our Senſations, Ideas, or thoſe things that are immediately perceived by Senſe, call them what you will: But they do not inform us that things exiſt without the Mind, or unperceived, like to thoſe which are perceived. This the Materialiſts themſelves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any Knowledge at all of external Things, it muſt be by Reaſon, inferring their Exiſtence from what is immediately perceived by Senſe. But what reaſon can induce us to believe the Exiſtence of Bodies without the Mind, from what we perceive, ſince the very Patrons of Matter themſelves do not pretend, there is any neceſſary Connexion betwixt them and our Ideas? I ſay it is granted on all hands (and what happens in Dreams, Phrenſies, and the like, puts it beyond diſpute) that it is poſſible we might be affected with all the Ideas we have now, though no Bodies exiſted without, reſembling them. Hence it is evident the Suppoſition of external Bodies is not neceſſary for the producing our Ideas: Since it is granted they are produced ſometimes, and might poſſibly be produced always in the ſame Order we ſee them in at preſent, without their Concurrence.

XIX. But though we might poſſibly have all our Senſations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought eaſier to conceive and explain the manner of their Production, by ſuppoſing external Bodies in their likeneſs rather than otherwiſe; and ſo it might be at leaſt probable there are ſuch things as Bodies that excite their Ideas in our Minds. But neither can this be ſaid; for though we give the Materialiſts their external Bodies, they by their own confeſſion are never the nearer knowing how our Ideas are produced: Since they own themſelves unable to comprehend in what manner Body can act upon Spirit, or how it is poſſible it ſhould imprint any Idea in the Mind. Hence it is evident the Production of Ideas or Senſations in our Minds, can be no reaſon why we ſhould ſuppoſe Matter or corporeal Subſtances, ſince that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with, or without this Suppoſition. If therefore it were poſſible for Bodies to exiſt without the Mind, yet to hold they do ſo, muſt needs be a very precarious Opinion; ſince it is to ſuppoſe, without any reaſon at all, that God has created innumerable Beings that are intirely uſeleſs, and ſerve to no manner of purpoſe.

XX. In ſhort, if there were external Bodies, it is impoſſible we ſhould ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very ſame Reaſons to think there were that we have now. Suppoſe, what no one can deny poſſible, an Intelligence, without the help of external Bodies, to be affected with the ſame train of Senſations or Ideas that you are, imprinted in the ſame order and with like vividneſs in his Mind. I ask whether that Intelligence hath not all the Reaſon to believe the Exiſtence of corporeal Subſtances, repreſented by his Ideas, and exciting them in his Mind, that you can poſſibly have for believing the ſame thing? Of this there can be no Queſtion; which one Conſideration is enough to make any reaſonable Perſon ſuſpect the ſtrength of whatever Arguments he may think himſelf to have, for the Exiſtence of Bodies without the Mind.

XXI. Were it neceſſary to add any farther Proof againſt the Exiſtence of Matter, after what has been ſaid, I could inſtance ſeveral of thoſe Errors and Difficulties (not to mention Impieties) which have ſprung from that Tenet. It has occaſioned numberleſs Controverſies and Diſputes in Philoſophy, and not a few of far greater moment in Religion. But I ſhall not enter into the detail of them in this Place, as well becauſe I think, Arguments à Poſteriori are unneceſſary for confirming what has been, if I miſtake not, ſufficiently demonſtrated à Priori, as becauſe I ſhall hereafter find occaſion to ſay ſomewhat of them.

XXII. I am afraid I have given cauſe to think me needleſly prolix in handling this Subject. For to what purpoſe is it to dilate on that which may be demonſtrated with the utmoſt Evidence in a Line or two, to any one that is capable of the leaſt Reflexion? It is but looking into your own Thoughts, and ſo trying whether you can conceive it poſſible for a Sound, or Figure, or Motion, or Colour, to exiſt without the Mind, or unperceived. This eaſy Trial may make you ſee, that what you contend for, is a downright Contradiction. Inſomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this Iſſue; if you can but conceive it poſſible for one extended moveable Subſtance, or in general, for any one Idea or any thing like an Idea, to exiſt otherwiſe than in a Mind perceiving it, I ſhall readily give up the Cauſe: And as for all that compages of external Bodies which you contend for, I ſhall grant you its Exiſtence, though you cannot either give me any Reaſon why you believe it exiſts, or aſſign any uſe to it when it is ſuppoſed to exiſt. I ſay, the bare poſſibility of your Opinion’s being true, ſhall paſs for an Argument that it is ſo.

XXIII. But ſay you, ſurely there is nothing eaſier than to imagine Trees, for inſtance, in a Park, or Books exiſting in a Cloſet, and no Body by to perceive them. I anſwer, you may ſo, there is no difficulty in it: But what is all this, I beſeech you, more than framing in your Mind certain Ideas which you call Books and Trees, and at the ſame time omitting to frame the Idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you your ſelf perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpoſe: It only ſhews you have the Power of imagining or forming Ideas in your Mind; but it doth not ſhew that you can conceive it poſſible, the Objects of your Thought may exiſt without the Mind: To make out this, it is neceſſary that you conceive them exiſting unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifeſt Repugnancy. When we do our utmoſt to conceive the Exiſtence of external Bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own Ideas. But the Mind taking no notice of it ſelf, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive Bodies exiſting unthought of or without the Mind; though at the ſame time they are apprehended by or exiſt in it ſelf. A little Attention will diſcover to any one the Truth and Evidence of what is here ſaid, and make it unneceſſary to inſiſt on any other Proofs againſt the Exiſtence of material Subſtance.

XXIV. It is very obvious, upon the leaſt Inquiry into our own Thoughts, to know whether it be poſſible for us to underſtand what is meant, by the abſolute Exiſtence of ſenſible Objects in themſelves, or without the Mind. To me it is evident thoſe Words mark out either a direct Contradiction, or elſe nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way, than to intreat they would calmly attend to their own Thoughts: And if by this Attention, the Emptineſs or Repugnancy of thoſe Expreſſions does appear, ſurely nothing more is requiſite for their Conviction. It is on this therefore that I inſiſt, to wit, that the abſolute Exiſtence of unthinking Things are Words without a Meaning, or which include a Contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earneſtly recommend to the attentive Thoughts of the Reader.

XXV. All our Ideas, Senſations, or the things which we perceive, by whatſoever Names they may be diſtinguiſhed, are viſibly inactive, there is nothing of Power or Agency included in them. So that one Idea or Object of Thought cannot produce, or make any Alteration in another. To be ſatisfied of the Truth of this, there is nothing elſe requiſite but a bare Obſervation of our Ideas. For ſince they and every part of them exiſt only in the Mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived. But whoever ſhall attend to his Ideas, whether of Senſe or Reflexion, will not perceive in them any Power or Activity; there is therefore no ſuch thing contained in them. A little Attention will diſcover to us that the very Being of an Idea implies Paſſiveneſs and Inertneſs in it, inſomuch that it is impoſſible for an Idea to do any thing, or, ſtrictly ſpeaking, to be the Cauſe of any thing: Neither can it be the Reſemblance or Pattern of any active Being, as is evident from Sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that Extenſion, Figure and Motion, cannot be the Cauſe of our Senſations. To ſay therefore, that theſe are the effects of Powers reſulting from the Configuration, Number, Motion, and Size of Corpuſcles, muſt certainly be falſe.

XXVI. We perceive a continual Succeſſion of Ideas, ſome are anew excited, others are changed or totally diſappear. There is therefore ſome Cauſe of theſe Ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this Cauſe cannot be any Quality or Idea or Combination of Ideas, is clear from the preceding Section. It muſt therefore be a Subſtance; but it has been ſhewn that there is no corporeal or material Subſtance: It remains therefore that the Cauſe of Ideas is an incorporeal active Subſtance or Spirit.

XXVII. A Spirit is one ſimple, undivided, active Being: as it perceives Ideas, it is called the Underſtanding, and as it produces or otherwiſe operates about them, it is called the Will. Hence there can be no Idea formed of a Soul or Spirit: For all Ideas whatever, being Paſſive and Inert, vide Sect. 25. they cannot repreſent unto us, by way of Image or Likeneſs, that which acts. A little Attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an Idea which ſhall be like that active Principle of Motion and Change of Ideas, is abſolutely impoſſible. Such is the Nature of Spirit or that which acts, that it cannot be of it ſelf perceived, but only by the Effects which it produceth. If any Man ſhall doubt of the Truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the Idea of any Power or active Being; and whether he hath Ideas of two principal Powers, marked by the Names Will and Underſtanding, diſtinct from each other as well as from a third Idea of Subſtance or Being in general, with a relative Notion of its ſupporting or being the Subject of the aforeſaid Powers, which is ſignified by the Name Soul or Spirit. This is what ſome hold; but ſo far as I can ſee, the Words Will, Soul, Spirit, do not ſtand for different Ideas, or in truth, for any Idea at all, but for ſomething which is very different from Ideas, and which being an Agent cannot be like unto, or repreſented by, any Idea whatſoever. Though it muſt be owned at the ſame time, that we have ſome Notion of Soul, Spirit, and the Operations of the Mind, ſuch as Willing, Loving, Hating, in as much as we know or underſtand the meaning of thoſe Words.

XXVIII. I find I can excite Ideas in my Mind at pleaſure, and vary and ſhift the Scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than Willing, and ſtraightway this or that Idea ariſes in my Fancy: And by the ſame Power it is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of Ideas doth very properly denominate the Mind active. Thus much is certain, and grounded on Experience: But when we talk of unthinking Agents, or of exciting Ideas excluſive of Volition, we only amuſe our ſelves with Words.

XXIX. But whatever Power I may have over my own Thoughts, I find the Ideas actually perceived by Senſe have not a like Dependence on my Will. When in broad Day-light I open my Eyes, it is not in my Power to chooſe whether I ſhall ſee or no, or to determine what particular Objects ſhall preſent themſelves to my View; and ſo likewiſe as to the Hearing and other Senſes, the Ideas imprinted on them are not Creatures of my Will. There is therefore ſome other Will or Spirit that produces them.

XXX. The Ideas of Senſe are more ſtrong, lively, and diſtinct than thoſe of the Imagination; they have likewiſe a Steddineſs, Order, and Coherence, and are not excited at random, as thoſe which are the effects of Humane Wills often are, but in a regular Train or Series, the admirable Connexion whereof ſufficiently teſtifies the Wiſdom and Benevolence of its Author. Now the ſet Rules or eſtabliſhed Methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the Ideas of Senſe, are called the Laws of Nature: And theſe we learn by Experience, which teaches us that ſuch and ſuch Ideas are attended with ſuch and ſuch other Ideas, in the ordinary courſe of Things.

XXXI. This gives us a ſort of Foreſight, which enables us to regulate our Actions for the benefit of Life. And without this we ſhould be eternally at a loſs: We could not know how to act any thing that might procure us the leaſt Pleaſure, or remove the leaſt Pain of Senſe. That Food nouriſhes, Sleep refreſhes, and Fire warms us; that to ſow in the Seed-time is the way to reap in the Harveſt, and, in general, that to obtain ſuch or ſuch Ends, ſuch or ſuch Means are conducive, all this we know, not by diſcovering any neceſſary Connexion between our Ideas, but only by the Obſervation of the ſettled Laws of Nature, without which we ſhould be all in Uncertainty and Confuſion, and a grown Man no more know how to manage himſelf in the Affairs of Life, than an Infant juſt born.

XXXII. And yet this conſiſtent uniform working, which ſo evidently diſplays the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of that governing Spirit whoſe Will conſtitutes the Laws of Nature, is ſo far from leading our Thoughts to him, that it rather ſends them a wandering after ſecond Cauſes. For when we perceive certain Ideas of Senſe conſtantly followed by other Ideas, and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute Power and Agency to the Ideas themſelves, and make one the Cauſe of another, than which nothing can be more abſurd and unintelligible. Thus, for Example, having obſerved that when we perceive by Sight a certain round luminous Figure, we at the ſame time perceive by Touch the Idea or Senſation called Heat, we do from thence conclude the Sun to be the cauſe of Heat. And in like manner perceiving the Motion and Colliſion of Bodies to be attended with Sound, we are inclined to think the latter an effect of the former.

XXXIII. The Ideas imprinted on the Senſes by the Author of Nature are called real Things: And thoſe excited in the Imagination being leſs regular, vivid and conſtant, are more properly termed Ideas, or Images of Things, which they copy and repreſent. But then our Senſations, be they never ſo vivid and diſtinct, are neverthelefs Ideas, that is, they exiſt in the Mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the Ideas of its own framing. The Ideas of Senſe are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more ſtrong, orderly, and coherent than the Creatures of the Mind; but this is no Argument that they exiſt without the Mind. They are alſo leſs dependent on the Spirit, or thinking Subſtance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the Will of another and more powerful Spirit: yet ſtill they are Ideas, and certainly no Idea, whether faint or ſtrong, can exiſt otherwiſe than in a Mind perceiving it.

XXXIV. Before we proceed any farther, it is neceſſary to ſpend ſome Time in anſwering Objections which may probably be made againſt the Principles hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I ſeem too prolix to thoſe of quick Apprehenſions, I hope it may be pardoned, ſince all Men do not equally apprehend things of this Nature; and I am willing to be underſtood by every one. Firſt then, it will be objected that by the foregoing Principles, all that is real and ſubſtantial in Nature is baniſhed out of the World: And inſtead thereof a chimerical Scheme of Ideas takes place. All things that exiſt, exiſt only in the Mind, that is, they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the Sun, Moon, and Stars? What muſt we think of Houſes, Rivers, Mountains, Trees, Stones; nay, even of our own Bodies? Are all theſe but ſo many Chimeras and Illuſions on the Fancy? To all which, and whatever elſe of the ſame ſort may be objected, I anſwer, that by the Principles premiſed, we are not deprived of any one thing in Nature. Whatever we ſee, feel, hear, or any wiſe conceive or underſtand, remains as ſecure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a rerum natura, and the Diſtinction between Realities and Chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from Sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have ſhewn what is meant by real Things in oppoſition to Chimeras, or Ideas of our own framing; but then they both equally exiſt in the Mind, and in that Senſe are alike Ideas.

XXXV. I do not argue againſt the Exiſtence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by Senſe or Reflexion. That the things I ſee with mine Eyes and touch with my Hands do exiſt, really exiſt, I make not the leaſt Queſtion. The only thing whoſe Exiſtence we deny, is that which Philoſophers call Matter or corporeal Subſtance. And in doing of this, there is no Damage done to the reſt of Mankind, who, I dare ſay, will never miſs it. The Atheiſt indeed will want the Colour of an empty Name to ſupport his Impiety; and the Philoſophers may poſſibly find, they have loſt a great Handle for Trifling and Diſputation.

XXXVI. If any Man thinks this detracts from the Exiſtence or Reality of Things, he is very far from underſtanding what hath been premiſed in the plaineſt Terms I could think of. Take here an Abſtract of what has been ſaid. There are ſpiritual Subſtances, Minds, or humane Souls, which will or excite Ideas in themſelves at pleaſure: but theſe are faint, weak, and unſteady in reſpect of others they perceive by Senſe, which being impreſſed upon them according to certain Rules or Laws of Nature, ſpeak themſelves the Effects of a Mind more powerful and wiſe than humane Spirits. Theſe latter are ſaid to have more Reality in them than the former: By which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and diſtinct, and that they are not Fictions of the Mind perceiving them. And in this Senſe, the Sun that I ſee by Day is the real Sun, and that which I imagine by Night is the Idea of the former. In the Senſe here given of Reality, it is evident that every Vegetable, Star, Mineral, and in general each part of the Mundane Syſtem, is as much a real Being by our Principles as by any other. Whether others mean any thing by the Term Reality different from what I do, I intreat them to look into their own Thoughts and ſee.

XXXVII. It will be urged that thus much at leaſt is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal Subſtances. To this my Anſwer is, That if the word Subſtance be taken in the vulgar Senſe, for a Combination of ſenſible Qualities, ſuch as Extenſion, Solidity, Weight, and the like; This we cannot be accuſed of taking away. But if it be taken in a philoſophic Senſe, for the ſupport of Accidents or Qualities without the Mind: Then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be ſaid to take away that which never had any Exiſtence, not even in the Imagination.

XXXVIII. But, ſay you, it ſounds very harſh to ſay we eat and drink Ideas, and are clothed with Ideas. I acknowledge it does ſo, the word Idea not being uſed in common Diſcourſe to ſignify the ſeveral Combinations of ſenſible Qualities, which are called Things: and it is certain that any Expreſſion which varies from the familiar Uſe of Language, will ſeem harſh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the Truth of the Propoſition, which in other Words is no more than to ſay, we are fed and clothed with thoſe Things which we perceive immediately by our Senſes. The Hardneſs or Softneſs, the Colour, Taſte, Warmth, Figure, and ſuch like Qualities, which combined together conſtitute the ſeveral ſorts of Victuals and Apparel, have been ſhewn to exiſt only in the Mind that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them Ideas; which Word, if it was as ordinarily uſed as Thing, would ſound no harſher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for diſputing about the Propriety, but the Truth of the Expreſſion. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink, and are clad with the immediate Objects of Senſe which cannot exiſt unperceived or without the Mind: I ſhall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to Cuſtom, that they ſhould be called Things rather than Ideas.

XXXIX. If it be demanded why I make uſe of the word Idea, and do not rather in compliance with Cuſtom call them Things. I anſwer, I do it for two Reaſons: Firſt, becauſe the Term Thing, in contradiſtinction to Idea, is generally ſuppoſed to denote ſomewhat exiſting without the Mind: Secondly, becauſe Thing hath a more comprehenſive Signification than Idea, including Spirits or thinking Things as well as Ideas. Since therefore the Objects of Senſe exiſt only in the Mind, and are withal thoughtleſs and inactive, I choſe to mark them by the word Idea, which implies thoſe Properties.

XL. But ſay what we can, ſome one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will ſtill believe his Senſes, and never ſuffer any Arguments, how plauſible ſoever, to prevail over the Certainty of them. Be it ſo, aſſert the Evidence of Senſe as high as you pleaſe, we are willing to do the ſame. That what I ſee, hear and feel doth exiſt, that is to ſay, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own Being. But I do not ſee how the Teſtimony of Senſe can be alledged, as a proof for the Exiſtence of any thing, which is not perceived by Senſe. We are not for having any Man turn Sceptic, and disbelieve his Senſes; on the contrary we give them all the Streſs and Aſſurance imaginable; nor are there any Principles more oppoſite to Scepticiſm, than thoſe we have laid down, as ſhall be hereafter clearly ſhewn.

XLI. Secondly, It will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real Fire, for Inſtance, and the Idea of Fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining ones ſelf burnt, and actually being ſo: This and the like may be urged in oppoſition to our Tenets. To all which the Anſwer is evident from what hath been already ſaid, and I ſhall only add in this place, that if real Fire be very different from the Idea of Fire, ſo alſo is the real Pain that it occaſions, very different from the Idea of the ſame Pain: and yet no Body will pretend that real Pain either is, or can poſſibly be, in an unperceiving Thing or without the Mind, any more than its Idea.

XLII. Thirdly, It will be objected that we ſee Things actually without or at a diſtance from us, and which conſequently do not exiſt in the Mind, it being abſurd that thoſe Things which are ſeen at the diſtance of ſeveral Miles, ſhould be as near to us as our own Thoughts. In anſwer to this, I deſire it may be conſidered, that in a Dream we do oft perceive Things as exiſting at a great diſtance off, and yet for all that, thoſe Things are acknowledged to have their Exiſtence only in the Mind.

XLIII. But for the fuller clearing of this Point, it may be worth while to conſider, how it is that we perceive Diſtance and Things placed at a Diſtance by Sight. For that we ſhould in truth ſee external Space, and Bodies actually exiſting in it, ſome nearer, others farther off, ſeems to carry with it ſome Oppoſition to what hath been ſaid, of their exiſting no where without the Mind. The Conſideration of this Difficulty it was, that gave birth to my Eſſay towards a new Theory of Viſion, which was publiſhed not long ſince. Wherein it is ſhewn that Diſtance or Outneſs is neither immediately of it ſelf perceived by Sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by Lines and Angles, or any thing that hath a neceſſary Connexion with it: But that it is only ſuggeſted to our Thoughts, by certain viſible Ideas and Senſations attending Viſion, which in their own Nature have no manner of Similitude or Relation, either with Diſtance, or Things placed at a Diſtance. But by a Connexion taught us by Experience, they come to ſignify and ſuggeſt them to us, after the ſame manner that Words of any Language ſuggeſt the Ideas they are made to ſtand for. Inſomuch that a Man born blind, and afterwards made to ſee, would not, at firſt Sight, think the Things he ſaw, to be without his Mind, or at any Diſtance from him. See Sect. 41. of the forementioned Treatiſe.

XLIV. The Ideas of Sight and Touch make two Species, intirely diſtinct and heterogeneous. The former are Marks and Prognoſtics of the latter. That the proper Objects of Sight neither exiſt without the Mind, nor are the Images of external Things, was ſhewn even in that Treatiſe. Though throughout the ſame, the contrary be ſuppoſed true of tangible Objects: Not that to ſuppoſe that vulgar Error, was neceſſary for eſtabliſhing the Notion therein laid down; but becauſe it was beſide my Purpoſe to examine and refute it in a Diſcourſe concerning Viſion. So that in ſtrict Truth the Ideas of Sight, when we apprehend by them Diſtance and Things placed at a Diſtance, do not ſuggeſt or mark out to us Things actually exiſting at a Diſtance, but only admoniſh us what Ideas of Touch will be imprinted in our Minds at ſuch and ſuch diſtances of Time, and in conſequence of ſuch or ſuch Actions. It is, I ſay, evident from what has been ſaid in the foregoing Parts of this Treatiſe, and in Sect. 147, and elſewhere of the Eſſay concerning Viſion, that viſible Ideas are the Language whereby the governing Spirit, on whom we depend, informs us what tangible Ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in caſe we excite this or that Motion in our own Bodies. But for a fuller Information in this Point, I refer to the Eſſay it ſelf.

XLV. Fourthly, It will be objected that from the foregoing Principles it follows, Things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The Objects of Senſe exiſt only when they are perceived: The Trees therefore are in the Garden, or the Chairs in the Parlour, no longer than while there is ſome body by to perceive them. Upon ſhutting my Eyes all the Furniture in the Room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created. In anſwer to all which, I refer the Reader to what has been ſaid in Sect. 3, 4, &c. and deſire he will conſider whether he means any thing by the actual Exiſtence of an Idea, diſtinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the niceſt Inquiry I could make, I am not able to diſcover that any thing elſe is meant by thoſe Words. And I once more intreat the Reader to ſound his own Thoughts, and not ſuffer himſelf to be impoſed on by Words. If he can conceive it poſſible either for his Ideas or their Archetypes to exiſt without being perceived, then I give up the Cauſe: But if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreaſonable for him to ſtand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an Abſurdity, the not aſſenting to thoſe Propoſitions which at Bottom have no meaning in them.

XLVI. It will not be amiſs to obſerve, how far the received Principles of Philoſophy are themſelves chargeable with thoſe pretended Abſurdities. It is thought ſtrangely abſurd that upon cloſing my Eyelids, all the viſible Objects round me ſhould be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what Philoſophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands, that Light and Colours, which alone are the proper and immediate Objects of Sight, are mere Senſations that exiſt no longer than they are perceived? Again, it may to ſome perhaps ſeem very incredible, that things ſhould be every moment creating, yet this very Notion is commonly taught in the Schools. For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the Exiſtence of Matter, and that the whole mundane Fabrick is framed out of it, are nevertheleſs of Opinion that it cannot ſubſiſt without the Divine Conſervation, which by them is expounded to be a continual Creation.

XLVII. Farther, a little Thought will diſcover to us, that though we allow the Exiſtence of Matter or Corporeal Subſtance, yet it will unavoidably follow from the Principles which are now generally admitted, that the particular Bodies of what kind ſoever, do none of them exiſt whilſt they are not perceived. For it is evident from Sect. XI. and the following Sections, that the Matter Philoſophers contend for, is an incomprehenſible Somewhat which hath none of thoſe particular Qualities, whereby the Bodies falling under our Senſes are diſtinguiſhed one from another. But to make this more plain, it muſt be remarked, that the infinite Diviſibility of Matter is now univerſally allowed, at leaſt by the moſt approved and conſiderable Philoſophers, who on the received Principles demonſtrate it beyond all Exception. Hence it follows, that there is an infinite Number of Parts in each Particle of Matter, which are not perceived by Senſe. The Reaſon therefore, that any particular Body ſeems to be of a finite Magnitude, or exhibits only a finite Number of Parts to Senſe, is, not becauſe it contains no more, ſince in itſelf it contains an infinite Number of Parts, but becauſe the Senſe is not acute enough to diſcern them. In proportion therefore as the Senſe is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater Number of Parts in the Object, that is, the Object appears greater, and its Figure varies, thoſe Parts in its Extremities which were before unperceivable, appearing now to bound it in very different Lines and Angles from thoſe perceived by an obtuſer Senſe. And at length, after various Changes of Size and Shape, when the Senſe becomes infinitely acute, the Body ſhall ſeem infinite. During all which there is no Alteration in the Body, but only in the Senſe. Each Body therefore conſidered in it ſelf, is infinitely extended, and conſequently void of all Shape or Figure. From which it follows, that though we ſhould grant the Exiſtence of Matter to be ever ſo certain, yet it is withal as certain, the Materialiſts themſelves are by their own Principles forced to acknowledge, that neither the particular Bodies perceived by Senſe, nor any thing like them exiſts without the Mind. Matter, I ſay, and each Particle thereof is according to them infinite and ſhapeleſs, and it is the Mind that frames all that variety of Bodies which compoſe the viſible World, any one whereof does not exiſt longer than it is perceived.

XLVIII. If we conſider it, the Objection propoſed in Sect. 45. will not be found reaſonably charged on the Principles we have premiſed, ſo as in truth to make any Objection at all againſt our Notions. For though we hold indeed the Objects of Senſe to be nothing elſe but Ideas which cannot exiſt unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no Exiſtence except only while they are perceived by us, ſince there may be ſome other Spirit that perceives them, though we do not. Wherever Bodies are ſaid to have no Exiſtence without the Mind, I would not be underſtood to mean this or that particular Mind, but all Minds whatſoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing Principles, that Bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exiſt not at all during the Intervals between our Perception of them.

XLIX. Fifthly, It may perhaps be objected, that if Extenſion and Figure exiſt only in the Mind, it follows that the Mind is extended and figured; ſince Extenſion is a Mode or Attribute, which (to ſpeak with the Schools) is predicated of the Subject in which it exiſts. I anſwer, Thoſe Qualities are in the Mind only as they are perceived by it, that is, not by way of Mode or Attribute, but only by way of Idea; and it no more follows, that the Soul or Mind is extended becauſe Extenſion exiſts in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, becauſe thoſe Colours are on all hands acknowledged to exiſt in it, and no where elſe. As to what Philoſophers ſay of Subject and Mode, that ſeems very groundleſs and unintelligible. For Inſtance, in this Propoſition, a Die is hard, extended and ſquare, they will have it that the Word Die denotes a Subject or Subſtance, diſtinct from the Hardneſs, Extenſion and Figure, which are predicated of it, and in which they exiſt. This I cannot comprehend: To me a Die ſeems to be nothing diſtinct from thoſe things which are termed its Modes or Accidents. And to ſay a Die is hard, extended and ſquare, is not to attribute thoſe Qualities to a Subject diſtinct from and ſupporting them, but only an Explication of the meaning of the Word Die.

L. Sixthly, You will ſay there have been a great many things explained by Matter and Motion: Take away theſe, and you deſtroy the whole Corpuſcular Philoſophy, and undermine thoſe mechanical Principles which have been applied with ſo much Succeſs to account for the Phænomena. In ſhort, whatever Advances have been made, either by ancient or modern Philoſophers, in the ſtudy of Nature, do all proceed on the Suppoſition, that Corporeal Subſtance or Matter doth really exiſt. To this I anſwer, that there is not any one Phænomenon explained on that Suppoſition, which may not as well be explained without it, as might eaſily be made appear by an Induction of Particulars. To explain the Phænomena, is all one as to ſhew, why upon ſuch and ſuch Occaſions we are affected with ſuch and ſuch Ideas. But how Matter ſhould operate on a Spirit, or produce any Idea in it, is what no Philoſopher will pretend to explain. It is therefore evident, there can be no uſe of Matter in Natural Philoſophy. Beſides, they who attempt to account for Things, do it not by Corporeal Subſtance, but by Figure, Motion, and other Qualities, which are in truth no more than mere Ideas, and therefore cannot be the Cauſe of any thing, as hath been already ſhewn. See Sect. 25.

LI. Seventhly, It will upon this be demanded whether it does not ſeem abſurd to take away natural Cauſes, and aſcribe every thing to the immediate Operation of Spirits? We muſt no longer ſay upon theſe Principles that Fire heats, or Water cools, but that a Spirit heats, and ſo forth. Would not a Man be deſervedly laught at, who ſhould talk after this manner? I anſwer, he would ſo; in ſuch things we ought to think with the Learned, and ſpeak with the Vulgar. They who to Demonſtration are convinced of the truth of the Copernican Syſtem, do nevertheleſs ſay the Sun riſes, the Sun ſets, or comes to the Meridian: And if they affected a contrary Stile in common talk, it would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little Reflexion on what is here ſaid will make it manifeſt, that the common uſe of Language would receive no manner of Alteration or Diſturbance from the Admiſſion of our Tenets.

LII. In the ordinary Affairs of Life, any Phraſes may be retained, ſo long as they excite in us proper Sentiments, or Diſpoſitions to act in ſuch a manner as is neceſſary for our well-being, how falſe ſoever they may be, if taken in a ſtrict and ſpeculative Senſe. Nay this is unavoidable, ſince Propriety being regulated by Cuſtom, Language is ſuited to the received Opinions, which are not always the trueſt. Hence it is impoſſible, even in the moſt rigid philoſophic Reaſonings, ſo far to alter the Bent and Genius of the Tongue we ſpeak, as never to give a handle for Cavillers to pretend Difficulties and Inconſiſtencies. But a fair and ingenuous Reader will collect the Senſe, from the Scope and Tenor and Connexion of a Diſcourſe, making allowances for thoſe inaccurate Modes of Speech, which uſe has made inevitable.

LIII. As to the Opinion that there are no Corporeal Cauſes, this has been heretofore maintained by ſome of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modern Philoſophers, who though they allow Matter to exiſt, yet will have GOD alone to be the immediate efficient Cauſe of all things. Theſe Men ſaw, that amongſt all the Objects of Senſe, there was none which had any Power or Activity included in it, and that by Conſequence this was likewiſe true of whatever Bodies they ſuppoſed to exiſt without the Mind, like unto the immediate Objects of Senſe. But then, that they ſhould ſuppoſe an innumerable Multitude of created Beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one Effect in Nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpoſe, ſince God might have done every thing as well without them; this I ſay, though we ſhould allow it poſſible, muſt yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant Suppoſition.

LIV. In the eighth place, The univerſal concurrent Aſſent of Mankind may be thought by ſome, an invincible Argument in behalf of Matter, or the Exiſtence of external things. Muſt we ſuppoſe the whole World to be miſtaken? And if ſo, what Cauſe can be aſſigned of ſo wide-ſpread and predominant an Error? I anſwer, Firſt, That upon a narrow Inquiry, it will not perhaps be found, ſo many as is imagined do really believe the Exiſtence of Matter or Things without the Mind. Strictly ſpeaking, to believe that which involves a Contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impoſſible: And whether the foregoing Expreſſions are not of that ſort, I refer it to the impartial Examination of the Reader. In one ſenſe indeed, Men may be ſaid to believe that Matter exiſts, that is, they act as if the immediate Cauſe of their Senſations, which affects them every moment and is ſo nearly preſent to them, were ſome ſenſeleſs unthinking Being. But that they ſhould clearly apprehend any Meaning marked by thoſe Words, and form thereof a ſettled ſpeculative Opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only Inſtance wherein Men impoſe upon themſelves, by imagining they believe thoſe Propoſitions they have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them.

LV. But ſecondly, Though we ſhould grant a Notion to be ever ſo univerſally and ſtedfaſtly adhered to, yet this is but a weak Argument of its Truth, to whoever conſiders what a vaſt number of Prejudices and falſe Opinions are every where embraced with the utmoſt Tenaciouſneſs, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) Part of Mankind. There was a time when the Antipodes and Motion of the Earth were looked upon as monſtrous Abſurdities, even by Men of Learning: And if it be conſidered what a ſmall proportion they bear to the reſt of Mankind, we ſhall find that at this Day, thoſe Notions have gained but a very inconſiderable footing in the World.

LVI. But it is demanded, that we aſſign a Cauſe of this Prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the World. To this I anſwer, That Men knowing they perceived ſeveral Ideas, whereof they themſelves were not the Authors, as not being excited from within, nor depending on the Operation of their Wills, this made them maintain, thoſe Ideas or Objects of Perception had an Exiſtence independent of, and without the Mind, without ever dreaming that a Contradiction was involved in thoſe Words. But Philoſophers having plainly ſeen, that the immediate Objects of Perception do not exiſt without the Mind, they in ſome degree corrected the miſtake of the Vulgar, but at the ſame time run into another which ſeems no leſs abſurd, to wit, that there are certain Objects really exiſting without the Mind, or having a Subſiſtence diſtinct from being perceived. of which our Ideas are only Images or Reſemblances, imprinted by thoſe Objects on the Mind. And this Notion of the Philoſophers owes its Origin to the ſame Cauſe with the former, namely, their being conſcious that they were not the Authors of their own Senſations, which they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore muſt have ſome Cauſe, diſtinct from the Minds on which they are imprinted.

LVII. But why they ſhould ſuppoſe the Ideas of Senſe to be excited in us by things in their likeneſs, and not rather have recourſe to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, Firſt, becauſe they were not aware of the Repugnancy there is, as well in ſuppoſing things like unto our Ideas exiſting without, as in attributing to them Power or Activity. Secondly, becauſe the ſupreme Spirit which excites thoſe Ideas in our Minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite Collection of ſenſible Ideas, as humane Agents are by their Size, Complexion, Limbs, and Motions. And thirdly, becauſe his Operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the Courſe of Nature is interrupted by a Miracle, Men are ready to own the Preſence of a ſuperior Agent. But when we ſee things go on in the ordinary Courſe, they do not excite in us any Reflexion; their Order and Concatenation, though it be an Argument of the greateſt Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs in their Creator, is yet ſo conſtant and familiar to us, that we do not think them the immediate Effects of a Free Spirit: eſpecially ſince Inconſtancy and Mutability in acting, though it be an Imperfection, is looked on as a mark of Freedom.

LVIII. Tenthly, It will be objected, that the Notions we advance, are inconſiſtent with ſeveral ſound Truths in Philoſophy and Mathematicks. For Example, The Motion of the Earth is now univerſally admitted by Aſtronomers, as a Truth grounded on the cleareſt and moſt convincing Reaſons; but on the foregoing Principles, there can be no ſuch thing. For Motion being only an Idea, it follows that if it be not perceived, it exiſts not; but the Motion of the Earth is not perceived by Senſe. I anſwer, That Tenet, if rightly underſtood, will be found to agree with the Principles we have premiſed: For the Queſtion, whether the Earth moves or no, amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reaſon to conclude from what hath been obſerved by Aſtronomers, that if we were placed in ſuch and ſuch Circumſtances, and ſuch or ſuch a Poſition and Diſtance, both from the Earth and Sun, we ſhould perceive the former to move among the Choir of the Planets, and appearing in all reſpects like one of them: And this, by the eſtabliſhed Rules of Nature, which we have no reaſon to miſtruſt, is reaſonably collected from the Phænomena.

LIX. We may, from the Experience we have had of the Train and Succeſſion of Ideas in our Minds, often make, I will not ſay uncertain Conjectures, but ſure and well-grounded Predictions, concerning the Ideas we ſhall be affected with, purſuant to a great Train of Actions, and be enabled to paſs a right Judgment of what would have appeared to us, in caſe we were placed in Circumſtances very different from thoſe we are in at preſent. Herein conſiſts the Knowledge of Nature, which may preſerve its Uſe and Certainty very conſiſtently with what hath been ſaid. It will be eaſy to apply this to whatever Objections of the like ſort may be drawn from the Magnitude of the Stars, or any other Diſcoveries in Aſtronomy or Nature.

LX. In the eleventh place, It will be demanded to what purpoſe ſerves that curious Organization of Plants, and the admirable Mechaniſm in the Parts of Animals; might not Vegetables grow, and ſhoot forth Leaves and Bloſſoms, and Animals perform all their Motions, as well without as with all that variety of internal Parts ſo elegantly contrived and put together, which being Ideas have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any neceſſary Connexion with the Effects aſcribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every Effect by a Fiat, or Act of his Will, we muſt think all that is fine and artificial in the Works, whether of Man or Nature, to be made in vain. By this Doctrine, though an Artiſt hath made the Spring and Wheels, and every Movement of a Watch, and adjuſted them in ſuch a manner as he knew would produce the Motions he deſigned; yet he muſt think all this done to no purpoſe, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the Index, and points to the Hour of the Day. If ſo, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the Movements, and putting them together? Why does not an empty Caſe ſerve as well as another? And how comes it to paſs, that whenever there is any Fault in the going of a Watch, there is ſome correſponding Diſorder to be found in the Movements, which being mended by a skilful Hand, all is right again? The like may be ſaid of all the Clock-work of Nature, great part whereof is ſo wonderfully fine and ſubtile, as ſcarce to be diſcerned by the beſt Microſcope. In ſhort, it will be asked, how upon our Principles any tolerable Account can be given, or any final Cauſe aſſigned of an innumerable multitude of Bodies and Machines framed with the moſt exquiſite Art, which in the common Philoſophy have very appoſite uſes aſſigned them, and ſerve to explain abundance of Phænomena.

LXI. To all which I anſwer, Firſt, That though there were ſome Difficulties relating to the Adminiſtration of Providence, and the uſes by it aſſigned to the ſeveral parts of Nature, which I could not ſolve by the foregoing Principles, yet this Objection could be of ſmall weight againſt the Truth and Certainty of thoſe things which may be proved à priori, with the utmoſt Evidence. Secondly, But neither are the received Principles free from the like Difficulties; for it may ſtill be demanded, to what end God ſhould take thoſe round-about Methods of effecting things by Inſtruments and Machines, which no one can deny might have been effected by the mere Command of his Will, without all that apparatus: Nay, if we narrowly conſider it, we ſhall find the Objection may be retorted with greater force on thoſe who hold the Exiſtence of thoſe Machines without the Mind; for it has been made evident, that Solidity, Bulk, Figure, Motion and the like, have no Activity or Efficacy in them, ſo as to be capable of producing any one Effect in Nature. See Sect. 25. Whoever therefore ſuppoſes them to exiſt (allowing the Suppoſition poſſible) when they are not perceived, does it manifeſtly to no purpoſe; ſince the only uſe that is aſſigned to them, as they exiſt unperceived, is that they produce thoſe perceivable Effects, which in truth cannot be aſcribed to any thing but Spirit.

LXII. But to come nearer the Difficulty, it muſt be obſerved, that though the Fabrication of all thoſe Parts and Organs be not abſolutely neceſſary to the producing any Effect, yet it is neceſſary to the producing of things in a conſtant, regular way, according to the Laws of Nature. There are certain general Laws that run through the whole Chain of natural Effects: Theſe are learned by the Obſervation and Study of Nature, and are by Men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the Uſe and Ornament of Life, as to the explaining the various Phænomena: Which Explication conſiſts only in ſhewing the Conformity any particular Phænomenon hath to the general Laws of Nature, or, which is the ſame thing, in diſcovering the Uniformity there is in the Production of natural Effects; as will be evident to whoever ſhall attend to the ſeveral Inſtances, wherein Philoſophers pretend to account for Appearances. That there is a great and conſpicuous Uſe in theſe regular conſtant Methods of working obſerved by the Supreme Agent, hath been ſhewn in Sect. 31. And it is no leſs viſible, that a particular Size, Figure, Motion and Diſpoſition of Parts are neceſſary, though not abſolutely to the producing any Effect, yet to the producing it according to the ſtanding mechanical Laws of Nature. Thus, for Inſtance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence which ſuſtains and rules the ordinary Courſe of things might, if He were minded to produce a Miracle, cauſe all the Motions on the Dial-plate of a Watch, though no Body had ever made the Movements, and put them in it: But yet if he will act agreeably to the Rules of Mechaniſm, by him for wiſe ends eſtabliſhed and maintained in the Creation, it is neceſſary that thoſe Actions of the Watchmaker, whereby he makes the Movements and rightly adjuſts them, precede the Production of the aforeſaid Motions; as alſo that any Diſorder in them be attended with the Perception of ſome correſponding Diſorder in the Movements, which being once corrected all is right again.

LXIII. It may indeed on ſome Occaſions be neceſſary, that the Author of Nature diſplay his overruling Power in producing ſome Appearance out of the ordinary Series of things. Such Exceptions from the general Rules of Nature are proper to ſurpriſe and awe Men into an Acknowledgment of the Divine Being: But then they are to be uſed but ſeldom, otherwiſe there is a plain Reaſon why they ſhould fail of that Effect. Beſides, God ſeems to chooſe the convincing our Reaſon of his Attributes by the Works of Nature, which diſcover ſo much Harmony and Contrivance in their Make, and are ſuch plain Indications of Wiſdom and Beneficence in their Author, rather than to aſtoniſh us into a belief of his Being by anomalous and ſurpriſing Events.

LXIV. To ſet this Matter in a yet clearer Light, I ſhall obſerve that what has been objected in Sect. 60. amounts in reality to no more than this: Ideas are not any how and at random produced, there being a certain Order and Connexion between them, like to that of Cauſe and Effect: There are alſo ſeveral Combinations of them, made in a very regular and artificial manner, which ſeem like ſo many Inſtruments in the hand of Nature, that being hid as it were behind the Scenes, have a ſecret Operation in producing thoſe Appearances which are ſeen on the Theatre of the World, being themſelves diſcernible only to the curious Eye of the Philoſopher. But ſince one Idea cannot be the Cauſe of another, to what purpoſe is that Connexion? And ſince thoſe Inſtruments, being barely inefficacious Perceptions in the Mind, are not ſubſervient to the Production of natural Effects; it is demanded why they are made, or, in other Words, what reaſon can be aſſigned why God ſhould make us, upon a cloſe Inſpection into his Works, behold ſo great Variety of Ideas, ſo artfully laid together, and ſo much according to Rule; it not being credible, that he would be at the Expence (if one may ſo ſpeak) of all that Art and Regularity to no purpoſe?

LXV. To all which my Anſwer is, Firſt, That the Connexion of Ideas does not imply the Relation of Cauſe and Effect, but only of a Mark or Sign with the thing ſignified. The Fire which I ſee is not the Cauſe of the Pain I ſuffer upon my approaching it, but the Mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner, the Noiſe that I hear is not the Effect of this or that Motion or Colliſion of the ambient Bodies, but the Sign thereof. Secondly, The Reaſon why Ideas are formed into Machines, that is, artificial and regular Combinations, is the ſame with that for combining Letters into Words. That a few Original Ideas may be made to ſignify a great number of Effects and Actions, it is neceſſary they be variouſly combined together: And to the end their uſe be permanent and univerſal, theſe Combinations muſt be made by Rule, and with wiſe Contrivance. By this means abundance of Information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from ſuch and ſuch Actions, and what Methods are proper to be taken, for the exciting ſuch and ſuch Ideas: Which in effect is all that I conceive to be diſtinctly meant, when it is ſaid that by diſcerning the Figure, Texture, and Mechaniſm of the inward Parts of Bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the ſeveral Uſes and Properties depending thereon, or the Nature of the thing.

LXVI. Hence it is evident, that thoſe things which under the Notion of a Cauſe cooperating or concurring to the Production of Effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great Abſurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious uſe aſſigned them, when they are conſidered only as Marks or Signs for our Information. And it is the ſearching after, and endeavouring to underſtand thoſe Signs inſtituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the Employment of the Natural Philoſopher, and not the pretending to explain things by Corporeal Cauſes; which Doctrine ſeems to have too much eſtranged the Minds of Men from that active Principle, that ſupreme and wiſe Spirit, in whom we live, move, and have our being.

LXVII. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected, that though it be clear from what has been ſaid, that there can be no ſuch thing as an inert, ſenſeleſs, extended, ſolid, figured, moveable Subſtance, exiſting without the Mind, ſuch as Philoſophers deſcribe Matter: Yet if any Man ſhall leave out of his Idea of Matter, the poſitive Ideas of Extenſion, Figure, Solidity and Motion, and ſay that he means only by that Word, an inert ſenſeleſs Subſtance, that exiſts without the Mind, or unperceived, which is the Occaſion of our Ideas, or at the preſence whereof God is pleaſed to excite Ideas in us: It doth not appear, but that Matter taken in this ſenſe may poſſibly exiſt. In Anſwer to which I ſay, Firſt, that it ſeems no leſs abſurd to ſuppoſe a Subſtance without Accidents, than it is to ſuppoſe Accidents without a Subſtance. But Secondly, though we ſhould grant this unknown Subſtance may poſſibly exiſt, yet where can it be ſuppoſed to be? That it exiſts not in the Mind is agreed, and that it exiſts not in Place is no leſs certain; ſince all Extenſion exiſts only in the Mind, as hath been already proved. It remains therefore that it exiſts no where at all.

LXVIII. Let us examine a little the Deſcription that is here given us of Matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived: For this is all that is meant by ſaying it is an inert, ſenſeleſs, unknown ſubſtance; which is a Definition intirely made up of Negatives, excepting only the relative Notion of its ſtanding under or ſupporting: But then it muſt be obſerved, that it ſupports nothing at all; and how nearly this comes to the Deſcription of a non-entity, I deſire may be conſidered. But, ſay you, it is the unknown Occaſion, at the preſence of which, Ideas are excited in us by the Will of God. Now I would fain know how any thing can be preſent to us, which is neither perceivable by Senſe nor Reflexion, nor capable of producing any Idea in our Minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any Form, nor exiſts in any Place. The Words to be preſent, when thus applied, muſt needs be taken in ſome abſtract and ſtrange Meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend.

LXIX. Again, let us examine what is meant by Occaſion: So far as I can gather from the common uſe of Language, that Word ſignifies, either the Agent which produces any Effect, or elſe ſomething that is obſerved to accompany, or go before it, in the ordinary Courſe of things. But when it is applied to Matter as above deſcribed, it can be taken in neither of thoſe ſenſes. For Matter is ſaid to be paſſive and inert, and ſo cannot be an Agent or efficient Cauſe. It is alſo unperceivable, as being devoid of all ſenſible Qualities, and ſo cannot be the Occaſion of our Perceptions in the latter Senſe: As when the burning my Finger is ſaid to be the Occaſion of the Pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling Matter an Occaſion? This Term is either uſed in no ſenſe at all, or elſe in ſome ſenſe very diſtant from its received Signification.

LXX. You will perhaps ſay that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is nevertheleſs perceived by GOD, to whom it is the Occaſion of exciting Ideas in our Minds. For, ſay you, ſince we obſerve our Senſations to be imprinted in an orderly and conſtant manner, it is but reaſonable to ſuppoſe there are certain conſtant and regular Occaſions of their being produced. That is to ſay, that there are certain permanent and diſtinct Parcels of Matter, correſponding to our Ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our Minds, or any ways immediately affect us, as being altogether paſſive and unperceivable to Us, they are nevertheleſs to GOD, by whom they are perceived, as it were ſo many Occaſions to remind him when and what Ideas to imprint on our Minds: that ſo things may go on in a conſtant uniform manner.

LXXI. In anſwer to this I obſerve, that as the Notion of Matter is here ſtated, the Queſtion is no longer concerning the Exiſtence of a thing diſtinct from Spirit and Idea, from perceiving and being perceived: But whether there are not certain Ideas, of I know not what ſort, in the Mind of GOD, which are ſo many Marks or Notes that direct him how to produce Senſations in our Minds, in a conſtant and regular Method: Much after the ſame manner as a Muſician is directed by the Notes of Muſick to produce that harmonious Train and Compoſition of Sound, which is called a Tune; though they who hear the Muſick do not perceive the Notes, and may be intirely ignorant of them. But this Notion of Matter ſeems too extravagant to deſerve a Confutation. Beſides, it is in effect no Objection againſt what we have advanced, to wit, that there is no ſenſeleſs, unperceived Subſtance.

LXXII. If we follow the Light of Reaſon, we ſhall, from the conſtant uniform Method of our Senſations, collect the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of the Spirit who excites them in our Minds. But this is all that I can ſee reaſonably concluded from thence. To me, I ſay, it is evident that the Being of a Spirit infinitely Wiſe, Good, and Powerful is abundantly ſufficient to explain all the Appearances of Nature. But as for inert ſenſeleſs Matter, nothing that I perceive has any the leaſt Connexion with it, or leads to the Thoughts of it. And I would fain ſee any one explain any the meaneſt Phænomenon in Nature by it, or ſhew any manner of Reaſon, though in the loweſt Rank of Probability, that he can have for its Exiſtence; or even make any tolerable Senſe or Meaning of that Suppoſition. For as to its being an Occaſion, we have, I think, evidently ſhewn that with regard to us it is no Occaſion: It remains therefore that it muſt be, if at all, the Occaſion to GOD of exciting Ideas in us; and what this amounts to, we have juſt now ſeen.

LXXIII. It is worth while to reflect a little on the Motives which induced Men to ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of material Subſtance; that ſo having obſerved the gradual ceaſing, and Expiration of thoſe Motives or Reaſons, we may proportionably withdraw the Aſſent that was grounded on them. Firſt therefore, it was thought that Colour, Figure, Motion, and the reſt of the ſenſible Qualities or Accidents, did really exiſt without the Mind; and for this reaſon, it ſeemed needful to ſuppoſe ſome unthinking Subſtratum or Subſtance wherein they did exiſt, ſince they could not be conceived to exiſt by themſelves. Afterwards, in proceſs of time, Men being convinced that Colours, Sounds, and the reſt of the ſenſible ſecondary Qualities had no Exiſtence without the Mind, they ſtripped this Subſtratum or material Subſtance of thoſe Qualities, leaving only the primary ones, Figure, Motion, and ſuch like, which they ſtill conceived to exiſt without the Mind, and conſequently to ſtand in need of a material Support. But it having been ſhewn, that none, even of theſe, can poſſibly exiſt otherwiſe than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows that we have no longer any reaſon to ſuppoſe the being of Matter. Nay, that it is utterly impoſſible there ſhould be any ſuch thing, ſo long as that Word is taken to denote an unthinking Subſtratum of Qualities or Accidents, wherein they exiſt without the Mind.

LXXIV. But though it be allowed by the Materialiſts themſelves, that Matter was thought of only for the ſake of ſupporting Accidents; and the reaſon intirely ceaſing, one might expect the Mind ſhould naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was ſolely grounded thereon. Yet the Prejudice is riveted ſo deeply in our Thoughts, that we can ſcarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, ſince the Thing it ſelf is indefenſible, at leaſt to retain the Name; which we apply to I know not what abſtracted and indefinite Notions of Being, or Occaſion, though without any ſhew of Reaſon, at leaſt ſo far as I can ſee. For what is there on our part, or what do we perceive amongſt all the Ideas, Senſations, Notions, which are imprinted on our Minds, either by Senſe or Reflexion, from whence may be inferred the Exiſtence of an inert, thoughtleſs, unperceived Occaſion? and on the other hand, on the part of an all-ſufficient Spirit, what can there be that ſhould make us believe, or even ſuſpect, he is directed by an inert Occaſion to excite Ideas in our Minds?

LXXV. It is a very extraordinary Inſtance of the force of Prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the Mind of Man retains ſo great a Fondneſs againſt all the evidence of Reaſon, for a ſtupid thoughtleſs Somewhat, by the interpoſition whereof it would, as it were, skreen it ſelf from the Providence of God, and remove him farther off from the Affairs of the World. But though we do the utmoſt we can, to ſecure the belief of Matter, though when Reaſon forſakes us, we endeavour to ſupport our Opinion on the bare poſſibility of the Thing, and though we indulge our ſelves in the full Scope of an Imagination not regulated by Reaſon, to make out that poor Poſſibility, yet the upſhot of all is, that there are certain unknown Ideas in the Mind of God; for this, if any thing, is all that I conceive to be meant by Occaſion with regard to God. And this, at the Bottom, is no longer contending for the Thing, but for the Name.

LXXVI. Whether therefore there are ſuch Ideas in the Mind of GOD, and whether they may be called by the name Matter, I ſhall not diſpute. But if you ſtick to the Notion of an unthinking Subſtance, or Support of Extenſion, Motion, and other ſenſible Qualities, then to me it is moſt evidently impoſſible there ſhould be any ſuch thing. Since it is a plain Repugnancy, that thoſe Qualities ſhould exiſt in or be ſupported by an unperceiving Subſtance.

LXXVII. But ſay you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtleſs ſupport of Extenſion, and the other Qualities or Accidents which we perceive; yet there may, perhaps, be ſome inert unperceiving Subſtance, or Subſtratum of ſome other Qualities, as incomprehenſible to us as Colours are to a Man born blind, becauſe we have not a Senſe adapted to them. But if we had a new Senſe, we ſhould poſſibly no more doubt of their Exiſtence, than a Blind-man made to ſee does of the Exiſtence of Light and Colours. I anſwer, Firſt, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the unknown Support of unknown Qualities, it is no matter whether there is ſuch a thing or no, ſince it no way concerns us: And I do not ſee the Advantage there is in diſputing about we know not what, and we know not why.

LXXVIII. But ſecondly, if we had a new Senſe, it could only furniſh us with new Ideas or Senſations: And then we ſhould have the ſame reaſon againſt their exiſting in an unperceiving Subſtance, that has been already offered with relation to Figure, Motion, Colour, and the like. Qualities, as hath been ſhewn, are nothing elſe but Senſations or Ideas, which exiſt only in a Mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the Ideas we are acquainted with at preſent, but likewiſe of all poſſible Ideas whatſoever.

LXXIX. But you will inſiſt, what if I have no reaſon to believe the Exiſtence of Matter, what if I cannot aſſign any uſe to it, or explain any thing by it, or even conceive what is meant by that Word? Yet ſtill it is no Contradiction to ſay that Matter exiſts, and that this Matter is in general a Subſtance, or Occaſion of Ideas; though, indeed, to go about to unfold the meaning, or adhere to any particular Explication of thoſe Words, may be attended with great Difficulties. I anſwer, when Words are uſed without a Meaning, you may put them together as you pleaſe, without danger of running into a Contradiction. You may ſay, for Example, that twice Two is equal to Seven, ſo long as you declare you do not take the Words of that Propoſition in their uſual Acceptation, but for Marks of you know not what. And by the ſame reaſon you may ſay, there is an inert thoughtleſs Subſtance without Accidents, which is the occaſion of our Ideas. And we ſhall underſtand juſt as much by one Propoſition, as the other.

LXXX. In the laſt place, you will ſay, What if we give up the Cauſe of material Subſtance, and aſſert, that Matter is an unknown Somewhat, neither Subſtance nor Accident, Spirit nor Idea, inert, thoughtleſs, indiviſible, immoveable, unextended, exiſting in no Place? For, ſay you, Whatever may be urged againſt Subſtance or Occaſion, or any other poſitive or relative Notion of Matter, hath no place at all, ſo long as this negative Definition of Matter is adhered to. I anſwer, you may, if ſo it ſhall ſeem good, uſe the word Matter in the ſame Senſe, that other Men uſe nothing, and ſo make thoſe Terms convertible in your Style. For after all, this is what appears to me to be the Reſult of that Definition, the Parts whereof when I conſider with Attention, either collectively, or ſeparate from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of Effect or Impreſſion made on my Mind, different from what is excited by the Term Nothing.

LXXXI. You will reply perhaps, that in the foreſaid Definition is included, what doth ſufficiently diſtinguiſh it from nothing, the poſitive, abſtract Idea of Quiddity, Entity, or Exiſtence. I own indeed, that thoſe who pretend to the Faculty of framing abſtract general Ideas, do talk as if they had ſuch an Idea, which is, ſay they, the moſt abſtract and general Notion of all, that is to me the moſt incomprehenſible of all others. That there are a great variety of Spirits of different Orders and Capacities, whoſe Faculties, both in Number and Extent, are far exceeding thoſe the Author of my Being has beſtowed on me, I ſee no reaſon to deny. And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, ſtinted, narrow Inlets of Perception, what Ideas the inexhauſtible Power of the SUPREME SPIRIT may imprint upon them, were certainly the utmoſt Folly and Preſumption. Since there may, be, for ought that I know, innumerable ſorts of Ideas or Senſations, as different from one another, and from all that I have perceived, as Colours are from Sounds. But how ready ſoever I may be, to acknowledge the Scantineſs of my Comprehenſion, with regard to the endleſs variety of Spirits and Ideas, that might poſſibly exiſt, yet for any one to pretend to a Notion of Entity or Exiſtence, abſtracted from Spirit and Idea, from perceiving and being perceived, is, I ſuſpect, a downright repugnancy and trifling with Words. It remains that we conſider the Objections, which may poſſibly be made on the part of Religion.

LXXXII. Some there are who think, that though the Arguments for the real Exiſtence of Bodies, which are drawn from Reaſon, be allowed not to amount to Demonſtration, yet the Holy Scriptures are ſo clear in the Point, as will ſufficiently convince every good Chriſtian, that Bodies do really exiſt, and are ſomething more than mere Ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable Facts related, which evidently ſuppoſe the reality of Timber, and Stone, Mountains, and Rivers, and Cities, and humane Bodies. To which I anſwer, that no ſort of Writings whatever, ſacred or profane, which uſe thoſe and the like Words in the vulgar Acceptation, or ſo as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their Truth called in queſtion by our Doctrine. That all thoſe Things do really exiſt, that there are Bodies, even corporeal Subſtances, when taken in the vulgar Senſe, has been ſhewn to be agreeable to our Principles: And the difference betwixt Things and Ideas, Realities and Chimeras, has been diſtinctly explained *. And I do not think, that either what Philoſophers call Matter, or the Exiſtence of Objects without the Mind, is any where mentioned in Scripture.* Sect. XXIX, XXX, XXXIII, XXXVI, &c.

LXXXIII. Again, whether there be, or be not external Things, it is agreed on all hands, that the proper Uſe of Words, is the marking our Conceptions, or Things only as they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows, that in the Tenets we have laid down, there is nothing inconſiſtent with the right Uſe and Significancy of Language, and that Diſcourſe of what kind ſoever, ſo far as it is intelligible, remains undiſturbed. But all this ſeems ſo manifeſt, from what hath been ſet forth in the Premiſes, that it is needleſs to inſiſt any farther on it.

LXXXIV. But it will be urged, that Miracles do, at leaſt, loſe much of their Streſs and Import by our Principles. What muſt we think of Moſes’s Rod, was it not really turned into a Serpent, or was there only a Change of Ideas in the Minds of the Spectators? And can it be ſuppoſed, that our Saviour did no more at the Marriage-Feaſt in Cana, than impoſe on the Sight, and Smell, and Taſte of the Gueſts, ſo as to create in them the Appearance or Idea only of Wine? The ſame may be ſaid of all other Miracles: Which, in conſequence of the foregoing Principles, muſt be looked upon only as ſo many Cheats, or Illuſions of Fancy. To this I reply, that the Rod was changed into a real Serpent, and the Water into real Wine. That this doth not, in the leaſt, contradict what I have elſewhere ſaid, will be evident from Sect. 34, and 35. But this Buſineſs of Real and Imaginary hath been already ſo plainly and fully explained, and ſo often referred to, and the Difficulties about it are ſo eaſily anſwered from what hath gone before, that it were an Affront to the Reader’s Underſtanding, to reſume the Explication of it in this place. I ſhall only obſerve, that if at Table all who were preſent ſhould ſee, and ſmell, and taſte, and drink Wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its Reality. So that, at Bottom, the Scruple concerning real Miracles hath no place at all on ours, but only on the received Principles, and conſequently maketh rather for, than againſt what hath been ſaid.

LXXXV. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to propoſe in the cleareſt Light, and gave them all the Force and Weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our Tenets in their Conſequences. Some of theſe appear at firſt Sight, as that ſeveral difficult and obſcure Queſtions, on which abundance of Speculation hath been thrown away, are intirely baniſhed from Philoſophy. Whether corporeal Subſtance can think? Whether Matter be infinitely diviſible? And how it operates on Spirit? theſe and the like Inquiries have given infinite Amuſement to Philoſophers in all Ages. But depending on the Exiſtence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our Principles. Many other Advantages there are, as well with regard to Religion as the Sciences, which it is eaſy for any one to deduce from what hath been premiſed. But this will appear more plainly in the Sequel.

LXXXVI. From the Principles we have laid down, it follows, humane Knowledge may naturally be reduced to two Heads, that of Ideas, and that of Spirits. Of each of theſe I ſhall treat in order. And firſt as to Ideas or unthinking Things, our Knowledge of theſe hath been very much obſcured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous Errors, by ſuppoſing a twofold Exiſtence of the Objects of Senſe, the one intelligible, or in the Mind, the other real and without the Mind: Whereby unthinking Things are thought to have a natural Subſiſtence of their own, diſtinct from being perceived by Spirits. This which, if I miſtake not, hath been ſhewn to be a moſt groundleſs and abſurd Notion, is the very Root of Scepticiſm; for ſo long as Men thought that real Things ſubſiſted without the Mind, and that their Knowledge was only ſo far forth real as it was conformable to real Things, it follows, they could not be certain that they had any real Knowledge at all. For how can it be known, that the Things which are perceived, are conformable to thoſe which are not perceived, or exiſt without the Mind?

LXXXVII. Colour, Figure, Motion, Extenſion and the like, conſidered only as ſo many Senſations in the Mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But if they are looked on as Notes or Images, referred to Things or Archetypes exiſting without the Mind, then are we involved all in Scepticiſm. We ſee only the Appearances, and not the real Qualities of Things. What may be the Extenſion, Figure, or Motion of any thing really and abſolutely, or in it ſelf, it is impoſſible for us to know, but only the proportion or the relation they bear to our Senſes. Things remaining the ſame, our Ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all repreſent the true Quality really exiſting in the Thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for ought we know, all we ſee, hear, and feel, may be only Phantom and vain Chimera, and not at all agree with the real Things, exiſting in Rerum Natura. All this Scepticiſm follows, from our ſuppoſing a difference between Things and Ideas, and that the former have a Subſiſtence without the Mind, or unperceived. It were eaſy to dilate on this Subject, and ſhew how the Arguments urged by Sceptics in all Ages, depend on the Suppoſition of external Objects.

LXXXVIII. So long as we attribute a real Exiſtence to unthinking Things, diſtinct from their being perceived, it is not only impoſſible for us to know with evidence the Nature of any real unthinking Being, but even that it exiſts. Hence it is, that we ſee Philoſophers diſtruſt their Senſes, and doubt of the Exiſtence of Heaven and Earth, of every thing they ſee or feel, even of their own Bodies. And after all their labour and ſtruggle of Thought, they are forced to own, we cannot attain to any ſelf-evident or demonſtrative Knowledge of the Exiſtence of ſenſible Things. But all this Doubtfulneſs, which ſo bewilders and confounds the Mind, and makes Philoſophy ridiculous in the Eyes of the World, vaniſhes, if we annex a meaning to our Words, and do not amuſe our ſelves with the Terms Abſolute, External, Exiſt, and ſuch like, ſignifying we know not what. I can as well doubt of my own Being, as of the Being of thoſe Things which I actually perceive by Senſe: It being a manifeſt Contradiction, that any ſenſible Object ſhould be immediately perceived by Sight or Touch, and at the ſame time have no Exiſtence in Nature, ſince the very Exiſtence of an unthinking Being conſiſts in being perceived.

LXXXIX. Nothing ſeems of more Importance, towards erecting a firm Syſteme of ſound and real Knowledge, which may be proof againſt the Aſſaults of Scepticiſm, than to lay the beginning in a diſtinct Explication of what is meant by Thing, Reality, Exiſtence: For in vain ſhall we diſpute concerning the real Exiſtence of Things, or pretend to any Knowledge thereof, ſo long as we have not fixed the meaning of thoſe Words. Thing or Being is the moſt general Name of all, it comprehends under it two Kinds intirely diſtinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the Name, to wit, Spirits and Ideas. The former are active, indiviſible Subſtances: The latter are inert, fleeting, dependent Beings, which ſubſiſt not by themſelves, but are ſupported by, or exiſt in Minds or ſpiritual Subſtances. We comprehend our own Exiſtence by inward Feeling or Reflexion, and that of other Spirits by Reaſon. We may be ſaid to have ſome Knowledge or Notion of our own Minds, of Spirits and active Beings, whereof in a ſtrict Senſe we have not Ideas. In like manner we know and have a Notion of relations between Things or Ideas, which relations are diſtinct from the Ideas or Things related, inaſmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it ſeems that Ideas, Spirits and Relations are all in their reſpective kinds, the Object of humane Knowledge and Subject of Diſcourſe: and that the Term Idea would be improperly extended to ſignify every thing we know or have any Notion of.

XC. Ideas imprinted on the Senſes are real Things, or do really exiſt; this we do not deny, but we deny they can ſubſiſt without the Minds which perceive them, or that they are Reſemblances of any Archetypes exiſting without the Mind: Since the very Being of a Senſation or Idea conſiſts in being perceived, and an Idea can be like nothing but an Idea. Again, the Things perceived by Senſe may be termed external, with regard to their Origin, in that they are not generated from within, by the Mind it ſelf, but imprinted by a Spirit diſtinct from that which perceives them. Senſible Objects may likewiſe be ſaid to be without the Mind, in another ſenſe, namely when they exiſt in ſome other Mind. Thus when I ſhut my Eyes, the Things I ſaw may ſtill exiſt, but it muſt be in another Mind.

XCI. It were a miſtake to think, that what is here ſaid derogates in the leaſt from the Reality of Things. It is acknowledged on the received Principles, that Extenſion, Motion, and in a word all ſenſible Qualities, have need of a Support, as not being able to ſubſiſt by themſelves. But the Objects perceived by Senſe, are allowed to be nothing but Combinations of thoſe Qualities, and conſequently cannot ſubſiſt by themſelves. Thus far it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the Things perceived by Senſe, an Exiſtence independent of a Subſtance, or Support wherein they may exiſt, we detract nothing from the received Opinion of their Reality, and are guilty of no Innovation in that reſpect. All the difference is, that according to us the unthinking Beings perceived by Senſe, have no Exiſtence diſtinct from Being perceived, and cannot therefore exiſt in any other Subſtance, than thoſe unextended, indiviſible Subſtances, or Spirits, which act, and think, and perceive them: Whereas Philoſophers vulgarly hold, that the ſenſible Qualities exiſt in an inert, extended, unperceiving Subſtance, which they call Matter, to which they attribute a natural Subſiſtence, exterior to all thinking Beings, or diſtinct from Being perceived by any Mind whatſoever, even the eternal Mind of the CREATOR, wherein they ſuppoſe only Ideas of the corporeal Subſtances created by him: If indeed they allow them to be at all created.

XCII. For as we have ſhewn the Doctrine of Matter or corporeal Subſtance, to have been the main Pillar and Support of Scepticiſm, ſo likewiſe upon the ſame Foundation have been raiſed all the impious Schemes of Atheiſm and Irreligion. Nay ſo great a difficulty hath it been thought, to conceive Matter produced out of nothing, that the moſt celebrated among the ancient Philoſophers, even of theſe who maintained the Being of a GOD, have thought Matter to be uncreated and coeternal with him. How great a Friend material Subſtance hath been to Atheiſts in all Ages, were needleſs to relate. All their monſtrous Syſtems have ſo viſible and neceſſary a dependence on it, that when this Corner-ſtone is once removed, the whole Fabrick cannot chooſe but fall to the Ground; inſomuch that it is no longer worth while, to beſtow a particular Conſideration on the Abſurdities of every wretched Sect of Atheiſts.

XCIII. That impious and profane Perſons ſhould readily fall in with thoſe Syſtems which favour their Inclinations, by deriding immaterial Subſtance, and ſuppoſing the Soul to be diviſible and ſubject to Corruption as the Body; which exclude all Freedom, Intelligence, and Deſign from the Formation of Things, and inſtead thereof make a ſelf-exiſtent, ſtupid, unthinking Subſtance the Root and Origin of all Beings. That they ſhould hearken to thoſe who deny a Providence, or Inſpection of a ſuperior Mind over the Affairs of the World, attributing the whole Series of Events either to blind Chance or fatal Neceſſity, ariſing from the Impulſe of one Body on another. All this is very natural. And on the other hand, when Men of better Principles obſerve the Enemies of Religion lay ſo great a Streſs on unthinking Matter, and all of them uſe ſo much Induſtry and Artifice to reduce every thing to it; methinks they ſhould rejoice to ſee them deprived of their grand Support, and driven from that only Fortreſs, without which your Epicureans, Hobbiſts, and the like, have not even the Shadow of a Pretence, but become the moſt cheap and eaſy Triumph in the World.

XCIV. The Exiſtence of Matter, or Bodies unperceived, has not only been the main Support of Atheiſts and Fataliſts, but on the ſame Principle doth Idolatry likewiſe in all its various Forms depend. Did Men but conſider that the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and every other Object of the Senſes, are only ſo many Senſations in their Minds, which have no other Exiſtence but barely being perceived, doubtleſs they would never fall down, and worſhip their own Ideas; but rather addreſs their Homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND which produces and ſuſtains all Things.

XCV. The ſame abſurd Principle, by mingling it ſelf with the Articles of our Faith, hath occaſioned no ſmall Difficulties to Chriſtians. For Example, about the Reſurrection, how many Scruples and Objections have been raiſed by Socinians and others? But do not the moſt plauſible of them depend on the ſuppoſition, that a Body is denominated the ſame, with regard not to the Form or that which is perceived by Senſe, but the material Subſtance which remains the ſame under ſeveral Forms? Take away this material Subſtance, about the Identity whereof all the Diſpute is, and mean by Body what every plain ordinary Perſon means by that Word, to wit, that which is immediately ſeen and felt, which is only a Combination of ſenſible Qualities, or Ideas: And then their moſt unanſwerable Objections come to nothing.

XCVI. Matter being once expelled out of Nature, drags with it ſo many ſceptical and impious Notions, ſuch an incredible number of Diſputes and puzling Queſtions, which have been Thorns in the Sides of Divines, as well as Philoſophers, and made ſo much fruitleſs Work for Mankind; that if the Arguments we have produced againſt it, are not found equal to Demonſtration (as to me they evidently ſeem) yet I am ſure all Friends to Knowledge, Peace, and Religion, have reaſon to wiſh they were.

XCVII. Beſide the external Exiſtence of the Objects of Perception, another great Source of Errors and Difficulties, with regard to Ideal Knowledge, is the Doctrine of abſtract Ideas, ſuch as it hath been ſet forth in the Introduction. The plaineſt Things in the World, thoſe we are moſt intimately acquainted with, and perfectly know, when they are conſidered in an abſtract way, appear ſtrangely difficult and incomprehenſible. Time, Place, and Motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what every Body knows; but having paſſed through the Hands of a Metaphyſician, they become too abſtract and fine, to be apprehended by Men of ordinary Senſe. Bid your Servant meet you at ſuch a Time, in ſuch a Place, and he ſhall never ſtay to deliberate on the meaning of thoſe Words: In conceiving that particular Time and Place, or the Motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not the leaſt Difficulty. But if Time be taken, excluſive of all thoſe particular Actions and Ideas that diverſify the Day, merely for the Continuation of Exiſtence, or Duration in Abſtract, then it will perhaps gravel even a Philoſopher to comprehend it.

XCVIII. Whenever I attempt to frame a ſimple Idea of Time, abſtracted from the ſucceſſion of Ideas in my Mind, which flows uniformly, and is participated by all Beings, I am loſt and embrangled in inextricable Difficulties. I have no Notion of it at all, only I hear others ſay, it is infinitely diviſible, and ſpeak of it in ſuch a manner as leads me to entertain odd Thoughts of my Exiſtence: Since that Doctrine lays one under an abſolute neceſſity of thinking, either that he paſſes away innumerable Ages without a Thought, or elſe that he is annihilated every moment of his Life: Both which ſeem equally abſurd. Time therefore being nothing, abſtracted from the Succeſſion of Ideas in our Minds, it follows that the Duration of any finite Spirit muſt be eſtimated by the Number of Ideas or Actions ſucceeding each other in that ſame Spirit or Mind. Hence it is a plain conſequence that the Soul always thinks: And in truth whoever ſhall go about to divide in his Thoughts, or abſtract the Exiſtence of a Spirit from its Cogitation, will, I believe, find it no eaſy Task.

XCIX. So likewiſe, when we attempt to abſtract Extenſion and Motion from all other Qualities, and conſider them by themſelves, we preſently loſe ſight of them, and run into great Extravagancies. All which depend on a two-fold Abſtraction: Firſt, it is ſuppoſed that Extenſion, for Example, may be abſtracted from all other ſenſible Qualities; and Secondly, that the Entity of Extenſion may be abſtracted from its being perceived. But whoever ſhall reflect, and take care to underſtand what he ſays, will, if I miſtake not, acknowledge that all ſenſible Qualities are alike Senſations, and alike real; that where the Extenſion is, there is the Colour too, to wit, in his Mind, and that their Archetypes can exiſt only in ſome other Mind: And that the Objects of Senſe are nothing but thoſe Senſations combined, blended, or (if one may ſo ſpeak) concreted together: None of all which can be ſuppoſed to exiſt unperceived.

C. What it is for a Man to be happy, or an Object good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an abſtract Idea of Happineſs, preſcinded from all particular Pleaſure, or of Goodneſs, from every thing that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewiſe, a Man may be juſt and virtuous, without having preciſe Ideas of Juſtice and Virtue. The Opinion that thoſe and the like Words ſtand for general Notions abſtracted from all particular Perſons and Actions, ſeems to have rendered Morality difficult, and the Study thereof of leſs uſe to Mankind. And in effect, the Doctrine of Abſtraction has not a little contributed towards ſpoiling the moſt uſeful Parts of Knowledge.

CI. The two great Provinces of ſpeculative Science, converſant about Ideas received from Senſe and their Relations, are natural Philoſophy and Mathematics; with regard to each of theſe I ſhall make ſome Obſervations. And Firſt, I ſhall ſay ſomewhat of natural Philoſophy. On this Subject it is, that the Sceptics triumph: All that ſtock of Arguments they produce to depreciate our Faculties, and make Mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally from this Head, to wit, that we are under an invincible Blindneſs as to the true and real Nature of Things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miſerably bantered, ſay they, by our Senſes, and amuſed only with the outſide and ſhew of Things. The real Eſſence, the internal Qualities, and Conſtitution of every the meaneſt Object, is hid from our view; ſomething there is in every drop of Water, every grain of Sand, which it is beyond the Power of humane Underſtanding to fathom or comprehend. But it is evident from what has been ſhewn, that all this Complaint is groundleſs, and that we are influenced by falſe Principles to that degree as to miſtruſt our Senſes, and think we know nothing of thoſe Things which we perfectly comprehend.

CII. One great Inducement to our pronouncing our ſelves ignorant of the Nature of Things, is the current Opinion that every thing includes within it ſelf the Cauſe of its Properties: Or that there is in each Object an inward Eſſence, which is the Source whence its diſcernible Qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for Appearances by occult Qualities, but of late they are moſtly reſolved into mechanical Cauſes, to wit, the Figure, Motion, Weight, and ſuch like Qualities of inſenſible Particles: Whereas in truth, there is no other Agent or efficient Cauſe than Spirit, it being evident that Motion, as well as all other Ideas, is perfectly inert. See Sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain the Production of Colours or Sounds, by Figure, Motion, Magnitude and the like, muſt needs be labour in vain. And accordingly, we ſee the Attempts of that kind are not at all ſatisfactory. Which may be ſaid, in general, of thoſe Inſtances, wherein one Idea or Quality is aſſigned for the Cauſe of another. I need not ſay, how many Hypotheſes and Speculations are left out, and how much the Study of Nature is abridged by this Doctrine.

CIII. The great mechanical Principle now in Vogue is Attraction. That a Stone falls to the Earth, or the Sea ſwells towards the Moon, may to ſome appear ſufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by Attraction? Is it that that Word ſignifies the manner of the Tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of Bodies, inſtead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But nothing is determined of the Manner or Action, and it may as truly (for ought we know) be termed Impulſe or Protruſion as Attraction. Again, the Parts of Steel we ſee cohere firmly together, and this alſo is accounted for by Attraction; but in this, as in the other Inſtances, I do not perceive that any thing is ſignified beſides the Effect it ſelf; for as to the manner of the Action whereby it is produced, or the Cauſe which produces it, theſe are not ſo much as aimed at.

CIV. Indeed, if we take a view of the ſeveral Phænomena, and compare them together, we may obſerve ſome likeneſs and conformity between them. For Example, in the falling of a Stone to the Ground, in the riſing of the Sea towards the Moon, in Coheſion and Cryſtallization, there is ſomething alike, namely an Union or mutual Approach of Bodies. So that any one of theſe or the like Phænomena, may not ſeem ſtrange or ſurpriſing to a Man who hath nicely obſerved and compared the Effects of Nature. For that only is thought ſo which is uncommon, or a thing by it ſelf, and out of the ordinary Courſe of our Obſervation. That Bodies ſhould tend towards the Center of the Earth, is not thought ſtrange, becauſe it is what we perceive every moment of our Lives. But that they ſhould have a like Gravitation towards the Center of the Moon, may ſeem odd and unaccountable to moſt Men, becauſe it is diſcerned only in the Tides. But a Philoſopher, whoſe Thoughts take in a larger compaſs of Nature, having obſerved a certain ſimilitude of Appearances, as well in the Heavens as the Earth, that argue innumerable Bodies to have a mutual Tendency towards each other, which he denotes by the general Name Attraction, whatever can be reduced to that, he thinks juſtly accounted for. Thus he explains the Tides by the Attraction of the Terraqueous Globe towards the Moon, which to him doth not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular Example of a general Rule or Law of Nature.

CV. If therefore we conſider the difference there is betwixt natural Philoſophers and other Men, with regard to their Knowledge of the Phænomena, we ſhall find it conſiſts, not in an exacter Knowledge of the efficient Cauſe that produces them, for that can be no other than the Will of a Spirit, but only in a greater Largeneſs of Comprehenſion, whereby Analogies, Harmonies, and Agreements are diſcovered in the Works of Nature, and the particular Effects explained, that is, reduced to general Rules, ſee Sect. 62. which Rules grounded on the Analogy, and Uniformneſs obſerved in the Production of natural Effects, are moſt agreeable, and ſought after by the Mind; for that they extend our Proſpect beyond what is preſent, and near to us, and enable us to make very probable Conjectures, touching Things that may have happened at very great diſtances of Time and Place, as well as to predict Things to come; which ſort of endeavour towards Omniſcience, is much affected by the Mind.

CVI. But we ſhould proceed warily in ſuch Things: for we are apt to lay too great a Streſs on Analogies, and to the prejudice of Truth, humour that Eagerneſs of the Mind, whereby it is carried to extend its Knowledge into general Theoremes. For Example, Gravitation, or mutual Attraction, becauſe it appears in many Inſtances, ſome are ſtraightway for pronouncing Univerſal; and that to attract, and be attracted by every other Body, is an eſſential Quality inherent in all Bodies whatſoever. Whereas it appears the fixed Stars have no ſuch Tendency towards each other: and ſo far is that Gravitation, from being eſſential to Bodies, that, in ſome Inſtances a quite contrary Principle ſeems to ſhew it ſelf: As in the perpendicular Growth of Plants, and the Elaſticity of the Air. There is nothing neceſſary or eſſential in the Caſe, but it depends intirely on the Will of the governing Spirit, who cauſes certain Bodies to cleave together, or tend towards each other, according to various Laws, whilſt he keeps others at a fixed Diſtance; and to ſome he gives a quite contrary Tendency to fly aſunder, juſt as he ſees convenient.

CVII. After what has been premiſed, I think we may lay down the following Concluſions. Firſt, It is plain Philoſophers amuſe themſelves in vain, when they inquire for any natural efficient Cauſe, diſtinct from a Mind or Spirit. Secondly, Conſidering the whole Creation is the Workmanſhip of a wiſe and good Agent, it ſhould ſeem to become Philoſophers, to employ their Thoughts (contrary to what ſome hold) about the final Cauſes of Things: And I muſt confeſs, I ſee no reaſon, why pointing out the various Ends, to which natural Things are adapted, and for which they were originally with unſpeakable Wiſdom contrived, ſhould not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a Philoſopher. Thirdly, From what hath been premiſed no reaſon can be drawn, why the Hiſtory of Nature ſhould not ſtill be ſtudied, and Obſervations and Experiments made, which, that they are of uſe to Mankind, and enable us to draw any general Concluſions, is not the Reſult of any immutable Habitudes, or Relations between Things themſelves, but only of GOD’s Goodneſs and Kindneſs to Men in the Adminiſtration of the World. See Sect. 30 and 31. Fourthly, By a diligent Obſervation of the Phænomena within our View, we may diſcover the general Laws of Nature, and from them deduce the other Phænomena, I do not ſay demonſtrate; for all Deductions of that kind depend on a Suppoſition that the Author of Nature always operates uniformly, and in a conſtant obſervance of thoſe Rules we take for Principles: Which we cannot evidently know.

CVIII. Thoſe Men who frame general Rules from the Phænomena, and afterwards derive the Phænomena from thoſe Rules, ſeem to conſider Signs rather than Cauſes. A Man may well underſtand natural Signs without knowing their Analogy, or being able to ſay by what Rule a Thing is ſo or ſo. And as it is very poſſible to write improperly, through too ſtrict an Obſervance of general Grammar-Rules: So in arguing from general Rules of Nature, it is not impoſſible we may extend the Analogy too far, and by that means run into Miſtakes.

CIX. As in reading other Books, a wiſe Man will chooſe to fix his Thoughts on the Senſe and apply it to uſe, rather than lay them out in Grammatical Remarks on the Language; ſo in peruſing the Volume of Nature, it ſeems beneath the Dignity of the Mind to affect an Exactneſs in reducing each particular Phænomenon to general Rules, or ſhewing how it follows from them. We ſhould propoſe to our ſelves nobler Views, ſuch as to recreate and exalt the Mind, with a proſpect of the Beauty, Order, Extent, and Variety of natural Things: Hence, by proper Inferences, to enlarge our Notions of the Grandeur, Wiſdom, and Beneficence of the CREATOR: And laſtly, to make the ſeveral Parts of the Creation, ſo far as in us lies, ſubſervient to the Ends they were deſigned for, GOD’s Glory, and the Suſtentation and Comfort of our ſelves and Fellow-Creatures.

CX. The beſt Key for the aforeſaid Analogy, or natural Science, will be eaſily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatiſe of Mechanics: In the entrance of which juſtly admired Treatiſe, Time, Space and Motion, are diſtinguiſhed into Abſolute and Relative, True and Apparent, Mathematical and Vulgar: Which Diſtinction, as it is at large explained by the Author, doth ſuppoſe thoſe Quantities to have an Exiſtence without the Mind: And that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to ſenſible Things, to which nevertheleſs in their own Nature, they bear no relation at all.

CXI. As for Time, as it is there taken in an abſolute or abſtracted Senſe, for the Duration or Perſeverance of the Exiſtence of Things, I have nothing more to add concerning it, after what hath been already ſaid on that Subject, Sect. 97 and 98. For the reſt, this celebrated Author holds there is an abſolute Space, which, being unperceivable to Senſe, remains in it ſelf ſimilar and immoveable: And relative Space to be the meaſure thereof, which being moveable, and defined by its Situation in reſpect of ſenſible Bodies, is vulgarly taken for immoveable Space. Place he defines to be that part of Space which is occupied by any Body. And according as the Space is abſolute or relative, ſo alſo is the Place. Abſolute Motion is ſaid to be the Tranſlation of a Body from abſolute Place to abſolute Place, as relative Motion is from one relative Place to another. And becauſe the Parts of abſolute Space, do not fall under our Senſes, inſtead of them we are obliged to uſe their ſenſible Meaſures: And ſo define both Place and Motion with reſpect to Bodies, which we regard as immoveable. But it is ſaid, in philoſophical Matters we muſt abſtract from our Senſes, ſince it may be, that none of thoſe Bodies which ſeem to be quieſcent, are truly ſo: And the ſame thing which is moved relatively, may be really at reſt. As likewiſe one and the ſame Body may be in relative Reſt and Motion, or even moved with contrary relative Motions at the ſame time, according as its Place is variouſly defined: All which Ambiguity is to be found in the apparent Motions, but not at all in the true or abſolute, which ſhould therefore be alone regarded in Philoſophy. And the true, we are told, are diſtinguiſhed from apparent or relative Motions by the following Properties. Firſt, In true or abſolute Motion, all Parts which preſerve the ſame Poſition with reſpect to the whole, partake of the Motions of the whole. Secondly, The Place being moved, that which is placed therein is alſo moved: So that a Body moving in a Place which is in Motion, doth participate the Motion of its Place. Thirdly, True Motion is never generated or changed, otherwiſe than by Force impreſſed on the Body it ſelf. Fourthly, True Motion is always changed by Force impreſſed on the Body moved. Fifthly, In circular Motion barely relative, there is no centrifugal Force, which nevertheleſs in that which is true or abſolute, is proportional to the Quantity of Motion.

CXII. But notwithſtanding what hath been ſaid, it doth not appear to me, that there can be any Motion other than relative: So that to conceive Motion, there muſt be at leaſt conceived two Bodies, whereof the Diſtance or Poſition in regard to each other is varied. Hence if there was one only Body in being, it could not poſſibly be moved. This ſeems evident, in that the Idea I have of Motion doth neceſſarily include Relation.

CXIII. But though in every Motion it be neceſſary to conceive more Bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely that on which the Force cauſing the change of diſtance is impreſſed, or in other Words, that to which the Action is applied. For however ſome may define Relative Motion, ſo as to term that Body moved, which changes its Diſtance from ſome other Body, whether the Force or Action cauſing that Change were applied to it, or no: Yet as Relative Motion is that which is perceived by Senſe, and regarded in the ordinary Affairs of Life, it ſhould ſeem that every Man of common Senſe knows what it is, as well as the beſt Philoſopher: Now I ask any one, whether in his Senſe of Motion as he walks along the Streets, the Stones he paſſes over may be ſaid to move, becauſe they change Diſtance with his Feet? To me it ſeems, that though Motion includes a Relation of one thing to another, yet it is not neceſſary that each Term of the Relation be denominated from it. As a Man may think of ſomewhat which doth not think, ſo a Body may be moved to or from another Body, which is not therefore it ſelf in Motion.

CXIV. As the Place happens to be variouſly defined, the Motion which is related to it varies. A Man in a Ship may be ſaid to be quieſcent, with relation to the ſides of the Veſſel, and yet move with relation to the Land. Or he may move Eaſtward in reſpect of the one, and Weſtward in reſpect of the other. In the common Affairs of Life, Men never go beyond the Earth to define the Place of any Body: And what is quieſcent in reſpect of that, is accounted abſolutely to be ſo. But Philoſophers who have a greater Extent of Thought, and juſter Notions of the Syſtem of Things, diſcover even the Earth it ſelf to be moved. In order therefore to fix their Notions, they ſeem to conceive the Corporeal World as finite, and the utmoſt unmoved Walls or Shell thereof to be the Place, whereby they eſtimate true Motions. If we ſound our own Conceptions, I believe we may find all the abſolute Motion we can frame an Idea of, to be at bottom no other than relative Motion thus defined. For as hath been already obſerved, abſolute Motion excluſive of all external Relation is incomprehenſible: And to this kind of Relative Motion, all the abovementioned Properties, Cauſes, and Effects aſcribed to abſolute Motion, will, if I miſtake not, be found to agree. As to what is ſaid of the centrifugal Force, that it doth not at all belong to circular Relative Motion: I do not ſee how this follows from the Experiment which is brought to prove it. See Philoſophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII. For the Water in the Veſſel, at that time wherein it is ſaid to have the greateſt relative circular Motion, hath, I think, no Motion at all: As is plain from the foregoing Section.

CXV. For to denominate a Body moved, it is requiſite, firſt, that it change its Diſtance or Situation with regard to ſome other Body: And ſecondly, that the Force or Action occaſioning that Change be applied to it. If either of theſe be wanting, I do not think that agreeably to the Senſe of Mankind, or the Propriety of Language, a Body can be ſaid to be in Motion. I grant indeed, that it is poſſible for us to think a Body, which we ſee change its Diſtance from ſome other, to be moved, though it have no force applied to it, (in which Senſe there may be apparent Motion,) but then it is, becauſe the Force cauſing the Change of Diſtance, is imagined by us to be applied or impreſſed on that Body thought to move. Which indeed ſhews we are capable of miſtaking a thing to be in Motion which is not, and that is all.

CXVI. From what hath been ſaid, it follows that the Philoſophic Conſideration of Motion doth not imply the being of an abſolute Space, diſtinct from that which is perceived by Senſe, and related to Bodies: Which that it cannot exiſt without the Mind, is clear upon the ſame Principles, that demonſtrate the like of all other Objects of Senſe. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we ſhall find we cannot even frame an Idea of pure Space, excluſive of all Body. This I muſt confeſs ſeems impoſſible, as being a moſt abſtract Idea. When I excite a Motion in ſome part of my Body, if it be free or without Reſiſtance, I ſay there is Space: But if I find a Reſiſtance, then I ſay there is Body: and in proportion as the Reſiſtance to Motion is leſſer or greater, I ſay the Space is more or leſs pure. So that when I ſpeak of pure or empty Space, it is not to be ſuppoſed, that the Word Space ſtands for an Idea diſtinct from, or conceivable without Body and Motion. Though indeed we are apt to think every Noun Subſtantive ſtands for a diſtinct Idea, that may be ſeparated from all others: Which hath occaſioned infinite Miſtakes. When therefore ſuppoſing all the World to be annihilated beſides my own Body, I ſay there ſtill remains pure Space: Thereby nothing elſe is meant, but only that I conceive it poſſible, for the Limbs of my Body to be moved on all ſides without the leaſt Reſiſtance: But if that too were annihilated, then there could be no Motion, and conſequently no Space. Some perhaps may think the Senſe of Seeing doth furniſh them with the Idea of pure Space; but it is plain from what we have elſewhere ſhewn, that the Ideas of Space and Diſtance are not obtained by that Senſe. See the Eſſay concerning Viſion.

CXVII. What is here laid down, ſeems to put an end to all thoſe Diſputes and Difficulties, which have ſprung up amongſt the Learned concerning the nature of pure Space. But the chief Advantage ariſing from it, is, that we are freed from that dangerous Dilemma, to which ſeveral who have employed their Thoughts on this Subject, imagine themſelves reduced, to wit, of thinking either that Real Space is GOD, or elſe that there is ſomething beſide GOD which is Eternal, Uncreated, Infinite, Indiviſible, Immutable. Both which may juſtly be thought pernicious and abſurd Notions. It is certain that not a few Divines, as well as Philoſophers of great note, have, from the Difficulty they found in conceiving either Limits or Annihilation of Space, concluded it muſt be Divine. And ſome of late have ſet themſelves particularly to ſhew, that the incommunicable Attributes of GOD agree to it. Which Doctrine, how unworthy ſoever it may ſeem of the Divine Nature, yet I do not ſee how we can get clear of it, ſo long as we adhere to the received Opinions.

CXVIII. Hitherto of Natural Philoſophy: We come now to make ſome Inquiry concerning that other great Branch of ſpeculative Knowledge, to wit, Mathematics. Theſe, how celebrated ſoever they may be, for their Clearneſs and Certainty of Demonſtration, which is hardly any where elſe to be found, cannot nevertheleſs be ſuppoſed altogether free from Miſtakes; if in their Principles there lurks ſome ſecret Error, which is common to the Profeſſors of thoſe Sciences with the reſt of Mankind. Mathematicians, though they deduce their Theoremes from a great height of Evidence, yet their firſt Principles are limited by the conſideration of Quantity: And they do not aſcend into any Inquiry concerning thoſe tranſcendental Maxims, which influence all the particular Sciences, each Part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, doth conſequently participate of the Errors involved in them. That the Principles laid down by Mathematicians are true, and their way of Deduction from thoſe Principles clear and inconteſtable, we do not deny. But we hold, there may be certain erroneous Maxims of greater Extent than the Object of Mathematics, and for that reaſon not expreſly mentioned, though tacitly ſuppoſed throughout the whole progreſs of that Science; and that the ill Effects of thoſe ſecret unexamined Errors are diffuſed through all the Branches thereof. To be plain, we ſuſpect the Mathematicians are, as well as other Men, concerned in the Errors ariſing from the Doctrine of abſtract general Ideas, and the Exiſtence of Objects without the Mind.

CXIX. Arithmetic hath been thought to have for its Object abſtract Ideas of Number. Of which to underſtand the Properties and mutual Habitudes is ſuppoſed no mean part of ſpeculative Knowledge. The Opinion of the pure and intellectual Nature of Numbers in Abſtract, hath made them in eſteem with thoſe Philoſophers, who ſeem to have affected an uncommon Fineneſs and Elevation of Thought. It hath ſet a Price on the moſt trifling numerical Speculations which in Practice are of no uſe, but ſerve only for Amuſement: And hath therefore ſo far infected the Minds of ſome, that they have dreamt of mighty Myſteries involved in Numbers, and attempted the Explication of natural Things by them. But if we inquire into our own Thoughts, and conſider what hath been premiſed, we may perhaps entertain a low Opinion of thoſe high Flights and Abſtractions, and look on all Inquiries about Numbers, only as ſo many difficiles nugæ, ſo far as they are not ſubſervient to practice, and promote the benefit of Life.

CXX. Unity in Abſtract we have before conſidered in Sect. 13, from which and what hath been ſaid in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is not any ſuch Idea. But Number being defined a Collection of Unites, we may conclude that, if there be no ſuch thing as Unity or Unite in Abſtract, there are no Ideas of Number in Abſtract denoted by the numeral Names and Figures. The Theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abſtracted from the Names and Figures, as likewiſe from all Uſe and Practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be ſuppoſed to have nothing at all for their Object. Hence we may ſee, how intirely the Science of Numbers is ſubordinate to Practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes, when conſidered as a matter of mere Speculation.

CXXI. However ſince there may be ſome, who, deluded by the ſpecious Shew of diſcovering abſtracted Verities, waſte their time in Arithmetical Theoremes and Problemes, which have not any Uſe: It will not be amiſs, if we more fully conſider, and expoſe the Vanity of that Pretence; And this will plainly appear, by taking a view of Arithmetic in its Infancy, and obſerving what it was that originally put Men on the Study of that Science, and to what Scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at firſt, Men, for eaſe of Memory and help of Computation, made uſe of Counters, or in writing of ſingle Strokes, Points or the like, each whereof was made to ſignify an Unite, that is, ſome one thing of whatever Kind they had occaſion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious ways, of making one Character ſtand in place of ſeveral Strokes, or Points. And laſtly, the Notation of the Arabians or Indians came into uſe, wherein by the repetition of a few Characters or Figures, and varying the Signification of each Figure according to the place it obtains, all Numbers may be moſt aptly expreſſed: Which ſeems to have been done in Imitation of Language, ſo that an exact Analogy is obſerved betwixt the Notation by Figures and Names, the nine ſimple Figures anſwering the nine firſt numeral Names and Places in the former, correſponding to Denominations in the latter. And agreeably to thoſe Conditions of the ſimple and local Value of Figures, were contrived Methods of finding from the given Figures or Marks of the Parts, what Figures and how placed, are proper to denote the whole or vice verſa. And having found the ſought Figures, the ſame Rule or Analogy being obſerved throughout, it is eaſy to read them into Words; and ſo the Number becomes perfectly known. For then the Number of any particular Things is ſaid to be known, when we know the Name or Figures (with their due arangement) that according to the ſtanding Analogy belong to them. For theſe Signs being known, we can by the Operations of Arithmetic, know the Signs of any Part of the particular Sums ſignified by them; and thus computing in Signs, (becauſe of the Connexion eſtabliſhed betwixt them and the diſtinct multitudes of Things, whereof one is taken for an Unite,) we may be able rightly to ſum up, divide, and proportion the things themſelves that we intend to number.

CXXII. In Arithmetic therefore we regard not the Things but the Signs, which nevertheleſs are not regarded for their own ſake, but becauſe they direct us how to act with relation to Things, and diſpoſe rightly of them. Now agreeably to what we have before obſerved, of Words in general (Sect. 19. Introd.) it happens here likewiſe, that abſtract Ideas are thought to be ſignified by Numeral Names or Characters, while they do not ſuggeſt Ideas of particular Things to our Minds. I ſhall not at preſent enter into a more particular Diſſertation on this Subject; but only obſerve that it is evident from what hath been ſaid, thoſe Things which paſs for abſtract Truths and Theoremes concerning Numbers, are, in reality, converſant about no Object diſtinct from particular numerable Things, except only Names and Characters; which originally came to be conſidered, on no other account but their being Signs, or capable to repreſent aptly, whatever particular Things Men had need to compute. Whence it follows, that to ſtudy them for their own ſake would be juſt as wiſe, and to as good purpoſe, as if a Man, neglecting the true Uſe or original Intention and Subſerviency of Language, ſhould ſpend his time in impertinent Criticiſms upon Words, or Reaſonings and Controverſies purely Verbal.

CXXIII. From Numbers we proceed to ſpeak of Extenſion, which conſidered as relative, is the Object of Geometry. The Infinite Diviſibility of Finite Extenſion, though it is not expreſly laid down, either as an Axiome or Theoreme in the Elements of that Science, yet is throughout the ſame every where ſuppoſed, and thought to have ſo inſeparable and eſſential a Connexion with the Principles and Demonſtrations in Geometry, that Mathematicians never admit it into Doubt, or make the leaſt Queſtion of it. And as this Notion is the Source from whence do ſpring all thoſe amuſing Geometrical Paradoxes, which have ſuch a direct Repugnancy to the plain common Senſe of Mankind, and are admitted with ſo much Reluctance into a Mind not yet debauched by Learning: So is it the principal occaſion of all that nice and extreme Subtilty, which renders the Study of Mathematics ſo difficult and tedious. Hence if we can make it appear, that no Finite Extenſion contains innumerable Parts, or is infinitely Diviſible, it follows that we ſhall at once clear the Science of Geometry from a great Number of Difficulties and Contradictions, which have ever been eſteemed a Reproach to Humane Reaſon, and withal make the Attainment thereof a Buſineſs of much leſs Time and Pains, than it hitherto hath been.

CXXIV. Every particular Finite Extenſion, which may poſſibly be the Object of our Thought, is an Idea exiſting only in the Mind, and conſequently each Part thereof muſt be perceived. If therefore I cannot perceive innumerable Parts in any Finite Extenſion that I conſider, it is certain they are not contained in it: But it is evident, that I cannot diſtinguiſh innumerable Parts in any particular Line, Surface, or Solid, which I either perceive by Senſe, or Figure to my ſelf in my Mind: Wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me, than that the Extenſions I have in View are no other than my own Ideas, and it is no leſs plain, that I cannot reſolve any one of my Ideas into an infinite Number of other Ideas, that is, that they are not infinitely Diviſible. If by Finite Extenſion be meant ſomething diſtinct from a Finite Idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and ſo cannot affirm or deny any thing of it. But if the terms Extenſion, Parts, and the like, are taken in any Senſe conceivable, that is, for Ideas; then to ſay a Finite Quantity or Extenſion conſiſts of Parts infinite in Number, is ſo manifeſt a Contradiction, that every one at firſt ſight acknowledges it to be ſo. And it is impoſſible it ſhould ever gain the Aſſent of any reaſonable Creature, who is not brought to it by gentle and ſlow Degrees, as a converted Gentile to the belief of Tranſubſtantiation. Ancient and rooted Prejudices do often paſs into Principles: And thoſe Propoſitions which once obtain the force and credit of a Principle, are not only themſelves, but likewiſe whatever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all Examination. And there is no Abſurdity ſo groſs, which by this means the Mind of Man may not be prepared to ſwallow.

CXXV. He whoſe Underſtanding is prepoſſeſt with the Doctrine of abſtract general Ideas, may be perſuaded, that (whatever be thought of the Ideas of Senſe,) Extenſion in abſtract is infinitely diviſible. And one who thinks the Objects of Senſe exiſt without the Mind, will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit, that a Line but an Inch long may contain innumerable Parts really exiſting, though too ſmall to be diſcerned. Theſe Errors are grafted as well in the Minds of Geometricians, as of other Men, and have a like influence on their Reaſonings; and it were no difficult thing, to ſhew how the Arguments from Geometry made uſe of to ſupport the infinite Diviſibility of Extenſion, are bottomed on them. At preſent we ſhall only obſerve in general, whence it is that the Mathematicians are all ſo fond and tenacious of this Doctrine.

CXXVI. It hath been obſerved in another place, that the Theoremes and Demonſtrations in Geometry are converſant about Univerſal Ideas. Sect. 15. Introd. Where it is explained in what Senſe this ought to be underſtood, to wit, that the particular Lines and Figures included in the Diagram, are ſuppoſed to ſtand for innumerable others of different Sizes: or in other words, the Geometer conſiders them abſtracting from their Magnitude: which doth not imply that he forms an abſtract Idea, but only that he cares not what the particular Magnitude is, whether great or ſmall, but looks on that as a thing indifferent to the Demonſtration: Hence it follows, that a Line in the Scheme, but an Inch long, muſt be ſpoken of, as though it contained ten thouſand Parts, ſince it is regarded not in it ſelf, but as it is univerſal; and it is univerſal only in its Signification, whereby it repreſents innumerable Lines greater than it ſelf, in which may be diſtinguiſhed ten thouſand Parts or more, though there may not be above an Inch in it. After this manner the Properties of the Lines ſignified are (by a very uſual Figure) transferred to the Sign, and thence through Miſtake thought to appertain to it conſidered in its own Nature.

CXXVII. Becauſe there is no Number of Parts ſo great, but it is poſſible there may be a Line containing more, the Inch-line is ſaid to contain Parts more than any aſſignable Number; which is true, not of the Inch taken abſolutely, but only for the Things ſignified by it. But Men not retaining that Diſtinction in their Thoughts, ſlide into a belief that the ſmall particular Line deſcribed on Paper contains in it ſelf Parts innumerable. There is no ſuch thing as the ten-thouſandth Part of an Inch; but there is of a Mile or Diameter of the Earth, which may be ſignified by that Inch. When therefore I delineate a Triangle on Paper, and take one ſide not above an Inch, for Example, in length to be the Radius: This I conſider as divided into ten thouſand or an hundred thouſand Parts, or more. For though the ten-thouſandth Part of that Line conſidered in it ſelf, is nothing at all, and conſequently may be neglected without any Error or Inconveniency; yet theſe deſcribed Lines being only Marks ſtanding for greater Quantities, whereof it may be the ten-thouſandth Part is very conſiderable, it follows, that to prevent notable Errors in Practice, the Radius muſt be taken of ten thouſand Parts, or more.

CXXVIII. From what hath been ſaid the reaſon is plain why, to the end any Theoreme may become univerſal in its Uſe, it is neceſſary we ſpeak of the Lines deſcribed on Paper, as though they contained Parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter throughly, we ſhall perhaps diſcover that we cannot conceive an Inch it ſelf as conſiſting of, or being diviſible into a thouſand Parts, but only ſome other Line which is far greater than an Inch, and repreſented by it. And that when we ſay a Line is infinitely diviſible, we muſt mean a Line which is infinitely great. What we have here obſerved ſeems to be the chief Cauſe, why to ſuppoſe the infinite Diviſibility of finite Extenſion hath been thought neceſſary in Geometry.

CXXIX. The ſeveral Abſurdities and Contradictions which flowed from this falſe Principle might, one would think, have been eſteemed ſo many Demonſtrations againſt it. But by I know not what Logic, it is held that Proofs à poſteriori are not to be admitted againſt Propoſitions relating to Infinity. As though it were not impoſſible even for an infinite Mind to reconcile Contradictions. Or as if any thing abſurd and repugnant could have a neceſſary Connexion with Truth, or flow from it. But whoever conſiders the Weakneſs of this Pretence, will think it was contrived on purpoſe to humour the Lazineſs of the Mind, which had rather acquieſce in an indolent Scepticiſm, than be at the Pains to go through with a ſevere Examination of thoſe Principles it hath ever embraced for true.

CXXX. Of late the Speculations about Infinites have run ſo high, and grown to ſuch ſtrange Notions, as have occaſioned no ſmall Scruples and Diſputes among the Geometers of the preſent Age. Some there are of great Note, who not content with holding that finite Lines may be divided into an infinite Number of Parts, do yet farther maintain, that each of thoſe Infiniteſimals is it ſelf ſubdiviſible into an Infinity of other Parts, or Infiniteſimals of a ſecond Order, and ſo on ad infinitum. Theſe, I ſay, aſſert there are Infiniteſimals of Infiniteſimals of Infiniteſimals, without ever coming to an end. So that according to them an Inch doth not barely contain an infinite Number of Parts, but an Infinity of an Infinity of an Infinity ad infinitum of Parts. Others there be who hold all Orders of Infiniteſimals below the firſt to be nothing at all, thinking it with good reaſon abſurd, to imagine there is any poſitive Quantity or Part of Extenſion, which though multiplied infinitely, can ever equal the ſmalleſt given Extenſion. And yet on the other hand it ſeems no leſs abſurd, to think the Square, Cube, or other Power of a poſitive real Root, ſhould it ſelf be nothing at all; which they who hold Infiniteſimals of the firſt Order, denying all of the ſubſequent Orders, are obliged to maintain.

CXXXI. Have we not therefore reaſon to conclude, that they are both in the wrong, and that there is in effect no ſuch thing as Parts infinitely ſmall, or an infinite number of Parts contained in any finite Quantity? But you will ſay, that if this Doctrine obtains, it will follow the very Foundations of Geometry are deſtroyed: And thoſe great Men who have raiſed that Science to ſo aſtoniſhing an height, have been all the while building a Caſtle in the Air. To this it may be replied, that whatever is uſeful in Geometry and promotes the benefit of humane Life, doth ſtill remain firm and unſhaken on our Principles. That Science conſidered as practical, will rather receive Advantage than any Prejudice from what hath been ſaid. But to ſet this in a due Light, may be the Subject of a diſtinct Inquiry. For the reſt, though it ſhould follow that ſome of the more intricate and ſubtile Parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any prejudice to Truth; yet I do not ſee what Damage will be thence derived to Mankind. On the contrary, it were highly to be wiſhed, that Men of great Abilities and obſtinate Application would draw off their Thoughts from thoſe Amuſements, and employ them in the Study of ſuch Things as lie nearer the Concerns of Life, or have a more direct Influence on the Manners.

CXXXII. If it be ſaid that ſeveral Theoremes undoubtedly true, are diſcovered by Methods in which Infiniteſimals are made uſe of, which could never have been, if their Exiſtence included a Contradiction in it. I anſwer, that upon a thorough Examination it will not be found, that in any Inſtance it is neceſſary to make uſe of or conceive infiniteſimal Parts of finite Lines, or even Quantities leſs than the Minimum Senſibile: Nay, it will be evident this is never done, it being impoſſible.

CXXXIII. By what we have premiſed, it is plain that very numerous and important Errors have taken their riſe from thoſe falſe Principles, which were impugned in the foregoing Parts of this Treatiſe. And the Oppoſites of thoſe erroneous Tenets at the ſame time appear to be moſt fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable Conſequences highly advantageous to true Philoſophy as well as to Religion. Particularly, Matter or the abſolute Exiſtence of Corporeal Objects, hath been ſhewn to be that wherein the moſt avowed and pernicious Enemies of all Knowledge, whether humane or divine, have ever placed their chief Strength and Confidence. And ſurely, if by diſtinguiſhing the real Exiſtence of unthinking Things from their being perceived, and allowing them a Subſiſtence of their own out of the Minds of Spirits, no one thing is explained in Nature; but on the contrary a great many inexplicable Difficulties ariſe: If the Suppoſition of Matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on ſo much as one ſingle Reaſon: If its Conſequences cannot endure the Light of Examination and free Inquiry, but skreen themſelves under the dark and general pretence of Infinites being incomprehenſible: If withal the Removal of this Matter be not attended with the leaſt evil Conſequence, if it be not even miſſed in the World, but every thing as well, nay much eaſier conceived without it: If laſtly, both Sceptics and Atheiſts are for ever ſilenced upon ſuppoſing only Spirits and Ideas, and this Scheme of Things is perfectly agreeable both to Reaſon and Religion: Methinks we may expect it ſhould be admitted and firmly embraced, though it were propoſed only as an Hypotheſis, and the Exiſtence of Matter had been allowed poſſible, which yet I think we have evidently demonſtrated that it is not.

CXXXIV. True it is, that in conſequence of the foregoing Principles, ſeveral Diſputes and Speculations, which are eſteemed no mean Parts of Learning, are rejected as uſeleſs. But how great a Prejudice ſoever againſt our Notions, this may give to thoſe who have already been deeply engaged, and made large Advances in Studies of that Nature: Yet by others, we hope it will not be thought any juſt ground of Diſlike to the Principles and Tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of Study, and make Humane Sciences more clear, compendious, and attainable, than they were before.

CXXXV. Having diſpatched what we intended to ſay concerning the knowledge of Ideas, the Method we propoſed leads us, in the next place, to treat of Spirits: With regard to which, perhaps Humane Knowledge is not ſo deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great Reaſon that is aſſigned for our being thought ignorant of the nature of Spirits, is, our not having an Idea of it. But ſurely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a Humane Underſtanding, that it does not perceive the Idea of Spirit, if it is manifeſtly impoſſible there ſhould be any ſuch Idea. And this, if I miſtake not, has been demonſtrated in Sect. 27: To which I ſhall here add that a Spirit has been ſhewn to be the only Subſtance or Support, wherein the unthinking Beings or Ideas can exiſt: But that this Subſtance which ſupports or perceives Ideas ſhould it ſelf be an Idea or like an Idea, is evidently abſurd.

CXXXVI. It will perhaps be ſaid, that we want a Senſe (as ſome have imagined) proper to know Subſtances withal, which if we had, we might know our own Soul, as we do a Triangle. To this I anſwer, that in caſe we had a new Senſe beſtowed upon us, we could only receive thereby ſome new Senſations or Ideas of Senſe. But I believe no Body will ſay, that what he means by the terms Soul and Subſtance, is only ſome particular ſort of Idea or Senſation. We may therefore infer, that all things duly conſidered, it is not more reaſonable to think our Faculties defective, in that they do not furniſh us with an Idea of Spirit or active thinking Subſtance, than it would be if we ſhould blame them for not being able to comprehend a round Square.

CXXXVII. From the opinion that Spirits are to be known after the manner of an Idea or Senſation, have riſen many abſurd and heterodox Tenets, and much Scepticiſm about the Nature of the Soul. It is even probable, that this Opinion may have produced a Doubt in ſome, whether they had any Soul at all diſtinct from their Body, ſince upon inquiry they could not find they had an Idea of it. That an Idea which is inactive, and the Exiſtence whereof conſiſts in being perceived, ſhould be the Image or Likeneſs of an Agent ſubſiſting by it ſelf, ſeems to need no other Refutation, than barely attending to what is meant by thoſe Words. But perhaps you will ſay, that tho’ an Idea cannot reſemble a Spirit, in its Thinking, Acting, or Subſiſting by it ſelf, yet it may in ſome other reſpects: And it is not neceſſary that an Idea or Image be in all reſpects like the Original.

CXXXVIII. I anſwer, If it does not in thoſe mentioned, it is impoſſible it ſhould repreſent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the Power of Willing, Thinking, and Perceiving Ideas, and there remains nothing elſe wherein the Idea can be like a Spirit. For by the Word Spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, conſtitutes the Signification of that Term. If therefore it is impoſſible that any degree of thoſe Powers ſhould be repreſented in an Idea, it is evident there can be no Idea of a Spirit.

CXXXIX. But it will be objected, that if there is no Idea ſignified by the Terms Soul, Spirit, and Subſtance, they are wholly inſignificant, or have no meaning in them. I anſwer, thoſe Words do mean or ſignify a real Thing, which is neither an Idea nor like an Idea, but that which perceives Ideas, and Wills, and Reaſons about them. What I am my ſelf, that which I denote by the Term I, is the ſame with what is meant by Soul or Spiritual Subſtance. If it be ſaid that this is only quarrelling at a Word, and that ſince the immediate Significations of other Names are by common conſent called Ideas, no reaſon can be aſſigned, why that which is ſignified by the Name Spirit or Soul may not partake in the ſame Appellation. I anſwer, All the unthinking Objects of the Mind agree, in that they are intirely paſſive, and their Exiſtence conſiſts only in being perceived: Whereas a Soul or Spirit is an active Being, whoſe Exiſtence conſiſts not in being perceived, but in perceiving Ideas and Thinking. It is therefore neceſſary, in order to prevent Equivocation and confounding Natures perfectly diſagreeing and unlike, that we diſtinguiſh between Spirit and Idea. See Sect. 27.

CXL. In a large Senſe indeed, we may be ſaid to have an Idea, or rather a Notion of Spirit, that is, we underſtand the meaning of the Word, otherwiſe we could not affirm or deny any thing of it. Moreover, as we conceive the Ideas that are in the Minds of other Spirits by means of our own, which we ſuppoſe to be Reſemblances of them: So we know other Spirits by means of our own Soul, which in that Senſe is the Image or Idea of them, it having a like reſpect to other Spirits, that Blueneſs or Heat by me perceived hath to thoſe Ideas perceived by another.

CXLI. It muſt not be ſuppoſed, that they who aſſert the natural Immortality of the Soul are of opinion, that it is abſolutely incapable of Annihilation even by the infinite Power of the CREATOR who firſt gave it Being: But only that it is not liable to be broken or diſſolved by the ordinary Laws of Nature or Motion. They indeed, who hold the Soul of Man to be only a thin vital Flame, or Syſtem of animal Spirits, make it periſhing and corruptible as the Body, ſince there is nothing more eaſily diſſipated than ſuch a Being, which it is naturally impoſſible ſhould ſurvive the Ruin of the Tabernacle, wherein it is incloſed. And this Notion hath been greedily embraced and cheriſhed by the worſt part of Mankind, as the moſt effectual Antidote againſt all Impreſſions of Virtue and Religion. But it hath been made evident, that Bodies of what Frame or Texture ſoever, are barely paſſive Ideas in the Mind, which is more diſtant and heterogeneous from them, than Light is from Darkneſs. We have ſhewn that the Soul is Indiviſible, Incorporeal, Unextended, and it is conſequently Incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer, than that the Motions, Changes, Decays, and Diſſolutions which we hourly ſee befal natural Bodies (and which is what we mean by the Courſe of Nature) cannot poſſibly affect an active, ſimple, uncompounded Subſtance: Such a Being therefore is indiſſoluble by the force of Nature, that is to ſay, the Soul of Man is naturally immortal.

CXLII. After what hath been ſaid, it is I ſuppoſe plain, that our Souls are not to be known in the ſame manner as ſenſeleſs, inactive Objects, or by way of Idea. Spirits and Ideas are Things ſo wholly different, that when we ſay, they exiſt, they are known, or the like, theſe Words muſt not be thought to ſignify any thing common to both Natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: And to expect that by any Multiplication or Enlargement of our Faculties, we may be enabled to know a Spirit as we do a Triangle, ſeems as abſurd as if we ſhould hope to ſee a Sound. This is inculcated becauſe I imagine it may be of Moment towards clearing ſeveral important Queſtions, and preventing ſome very dangerous Errors concerning the Nature of the Soul. We may not I think ſtrictly be ſaid to have an Idea of an active Being, or of an Action, although we may be ſaid to have a Notion of them. I have ſome Knowledge or Notion of my Mind, and its Acts about Ideas, inaſmuch as I know or underſtand what is meant by thoſe Words. What I know, that I have ſome Notion of. I will not ſay, that the Terms Idea and Notion may not be uſed convertibly, if the World will have it ſo. But yet it conduceth to Clearneſs and Propriety, that we diſtinguiſh Things very different by different Names. It is alſo to be remarked, that all Relations including an Act of the Mind, we cannot ſo properly be ſaid to have an Idea, but rather a Notion of the Relations or Habitudes between Things. But if in the modern way the Word Idea is extended to Spirits, and Relations and Acts; this is after all an Affair of verbal Concern.

CXLIII. It will not be amiſs to add, that the Doctrine of Abſtract Ideas hath had no ſmall ſhare in rendering thoſe Sciences intricate and obſcure, which are particularly converſant about ſpiritual Things. Men have imagined they could frame abſtract Notions of the Powers and Acts of the Mind, and conſider them preſcinded, as well from the Mind or Spirit it ſelf, as from their reſpective Objects and Effects. Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous Terms preſumed to ſtand for abſtract Notions, have been introduced into Metaphyſics and Morality, and from theſe have grown infinite Diſtractions and Diſputes amongſt the Learned.

CXLIV. But nothing ſeems more to have contributed towards engaging Men in Controverſies and Miſtakes, with regard to the Nature and Operations of the Mind, than the being uſed to ſpeak of thoſe Things, in Terms borrowed from ſenſible Ideas. For Example, the Will is termed the Motion of the Soul: This infuſes a Belief, that the Mind of Man is as a Ball in Motion, impelled and determined by the Objects of Senſe, as neceſſarily as that is by the Stroke of a Racket. Hence ariſe endleſs Scruples and Errors of dangerous conſequence in Morality. All which I doubt not may be cleared, and Truth appear plain, uniform, and conſiſtent, could but Philoſophers be prevailed on to retire into themſelves, and attentively conſider their own meaning.

CXLV. From what hath been ſaid, it is plain that we cannot know the Exiſtence of other Spirits, otherwiſe than by their Operations, or the Ideas by them excited in us. I perceive ſeveral Motions, Changes, and Combinations of Ideas, that inform me there are certain particular Agents like my ſelf, which accompany them, and concur in their Production. Hence the Knowledge I have of other Spirits is not immediate, as is the Knowledge of my Ideas; but depending on the Intervention of Ideas, by me referred to Agents or Spirits diſtinct from my ſelf, as Effects or concomitant Signs.

CXLVI. But though there be ſome Things which convince us, humane Agents are concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one, that thoſe Things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the Ideas or Senſations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on the Wills of Men. There is therefore ſome other Spirit that cauſes them, ſince it is repugnant that they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. See Sect. 29. But if we attentively conſider the conſtant Regularity, Order, and Concatenation of natural Things, the ſurpriſing Magnificence, Beauty, and Perfection of the larger, and the exquiſite Contrivance of the ſmaller Parts of the Creation, together with the exact Harmony and Correſpondence of the whole, but above all, the never enough admired Laws of Pain and Pleaſure, and the Inſtincts or natural Inclinations, Appetites, and Paſſions of Animals; I ſay if we conſider all theſe Things, and at the ſame time attend to the meaning and import of the Attributes, One, Eternal, infinitely Wiſe, Good, and Perfect, we ſhall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforeſaid Spirit, who works all in all, and by whom all things conſiſt.

CXLVII. Hence it is evident, that GOD is known as certainly and immediately as any other Mind or Spirit whatſoever, diſtinct from our ſelves. We may even aſſert, that the Exiſtence of GOD is far more evidently perceived than the Exiſtence of Men; becauſe the Effects of Nature are infinitely more numerous and conſiderable, than thoſe aſcribed to humane Agents. There is not any one Mark that denotes a Man, or Effect produced by him, which doth not more ſtrongly evince the Being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For it is evident that in affecting other Perſons, the Will of Man hath no other Object, than barely the Motion of the Limbs of his Body; but that ſuch a Motion ſhould be attended by, or excite any Idea in the Mind of another, depends wholly on the Will of the CREATOR. He alone it is who upholding all Things by the Word of his Power, maintains that Intercourſe between Spirits, whereby they are able to perceive the Exiſtence of each other. And yet this pure and clear Light which enlightens every one, is it ſelf inviſible.

CXLVIII. It ſeems to be a general Pretence of the unthinking Herd, that they cannot ſee GOD. Could we but ſee him, ſay they, as we ſee a Man, we ſhould believe that he is, and believing obey his Commands. But alas we need only open our Eyes to ſee the ſovereign Lord of all Things with a more full and clear View, than we do any one of our Fellow-Creatures. Not that I imagine we ſee GOD (as ſome will have it) by a direct and immediate View, or ſee Corporeal Things, not by themſelves, but by ſeeing that which repreſents them in the Eſſence of GOD, which Doctrine is I muſt confeſs to me incomprehenſible. But I ſhall explain my Meaning. A humane Spirit or Perſon is not perceived by Senſe, as not being an Idea; when therefore we ſee the Colour, Size, Figure, and Motions of a Man, we perceive only certain Senſations or Ideas excited in our own Minds: And theſe being exhibited to our View in ſundry diſtinct Collections, ſerve to mark out unto us the Exiſtence of finite and created Spirits like our ſelves. Hence it is plain, we do not ſee a Man, if by Man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do: But only ſuch a certain Collection of Ideas, as directs us to think there is a diſtinct Principle of Thought and Motion like to our ſelves, accompanying and repreſented by it. And after the ſame manner we ſee GOD; all the difference is, that whereas ſome one finite and narrow Aſſemblage of Ideas denotes a particular humane Mind, whitherſoever we direct our View, we do at all Times and in all Places perceive manifeſt Tokens of the Divinity: Every thing we ſee, hear, feel, or any wiſe perceive by Senſe, being a Sign or Effect of the Power of GOD; as is our Perception of thoſe very Motions, which are produced by Men.

CXLIX. It is therefore plain, that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the leaſt Reflexion, than the Exiſtence of GOD, or a Spirit who is intimately preſent to our Minds, producing in them all that variety of Ideas or Senſations, which continually affect us, on whom we have an abſolute and intire Dependence, in ſhort, in whom we live, and move, and have our Being. That the Diſcovery of this great Truth which lies ſo near and obvious to the Mind, ſhould be attained to by the Reaſon of ſo very few, is a ſad inſtance of the Stupidity and Inattention of Men, who, though they are ſurrounded with ſuch clear Manifeſtations of the Deity, are yet ſo little affected by them, that they ſeem as it were blinded with exceſs of Light.

CL. But you will ſay, Hath Nature no ſhare in the Production of natural Things, and muſt they be all aſcribed to the immediate and ſole Operation of GOD? I anſwer, If by Nature is meant only the viſible Series of Effects, or Senſations imprinted on our Minds according to certain fixed and general Laws: Then it is plain, that Nature taken in this Senſe cannot produce any thing at all. But if by Nature is meant ſome Being diſtinct from GOD, as well as from the Laws of Nature, and Things perceived by Senſe, I muſt confeſs that Word is to me an empty Sound, without any intelligible Meaning annexed to it. Nature in this Acceptation is a vain Chimera introduced by thoſe Heathens, who had not juſt Notions of the Omnipreſence and infinite Perfection of GOD. But it is more unaccountable, that it ſhould be received among Chriſtians profeſſing Belief in the Holy Scriptures, which conſtantly aſcribe thoſe Effects to the immediate Hand of GOD, that Heathen Philoſophers are wont to impute to Nature. The LORD, he cauſeth the Vapours to aſcend; he maketh Lightnings with Rain; he bringeth forth the Wind out of his Treaſures, Jerem. Chap. 10. ver. 13. He turneth the ſhadow of Death into the Morning, and maketh the Day dark with Night, Amos Chap. 5. ver. 8. He viſiteth the Earth, and maketh it ſoft with Showers: He bleſſeth the ſpringing thereof, and crowneth the Year with his Goodneſs; ſo that the Paſtures are clothed with Flocks, and the Valleys are covered over with Corn. See Pſalm 65. But notwithſtanding that this is the conſtant Language of Scripture; yet we have I know not what Averſion from believing, that GOD concerns himſelf ſo nearly in our Affairs. Fain would we ſuppoſe him at a great diſtance off, and ſubſtitute ſome blind unthinking Deputy in his ſtead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) he be not far from every one of us.

CLI. It will I doubt not be objected, that the ſlow and gradual Methods obſerved in the Production of natural Things, do not ſeem to have for their Cauſe the immediate Hand of an almighty Agent. Beſides, Monſters, untimely Births, Fruits blaſted in the Bloſſom, Rains falling in deſert Places, Miſeries incident to humane Life, are ſo many Arguments that the whole Frame of Nature is not immediately actuated and ſuperintended by a Spirit of infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs. But the Anſwer to this Objection is in a good meaſure plain from Sect. 62, it being viſible, that the aforeſaid Methods of Nature are abſolutely neceſſary, in order to working by the moſt ſimple and general Rules, and after a ſteady and conſiſtent Manner; which argues both the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of GOD. Such is the artificial Contrivance of this mighty Machine of Nature, that whilſt its Motions and various Phænomena ſtrike on our Senſes, the Hand which actuates the whole is it ſelf unperceivable to Men of Fleſh and Blood. Verily (ſaith the Prophet) thou art a GOD that hideſt thy ſelf, Iſaiah Chap. 45. ver. 15. But though GOD conceal himſelf from the Eyes of the Senſual and Lazy, who will not be at the leaſt Expence of Thought; yet to an unbiaſſed and attentive Mind, nothing can be more plainly legible, than the intimate Preſence of an All-wiſe Spirit, who faſhions, regulates, and ſuſtains the whole Syſteme of Being. It is clear from what we have elſewhere obſerved, that the operating according to general and ſtated Laws, is ſo neceſſary for our Guidance in the Affairs of Life, and letting us into the Secret of Nature, that without it, all Reach and Compaſs of Thought, all humane Sagacity and Deſign could ſerve to no manner of purpoſe: It were even impoſſible there ſhould be any ſuch Faculties or Powers in the Mind. See Sect. 31. Which one Conſideration abundantly out-balances whatever particular Inconveniences may thence ariſe.

CLII. We ſhould further conſider, that the very Blemiſhes and Defects of Nature are not without their Uſe, in that they make an agreeable ſort of Variety, and augment the Beauty of the reſt of the Creation, as Shades in a Picture ſerve to ſet off the brighter and more enlightened Parts. We would likewiſe do well to examine, whether our taxing the Waſte of Seeds and Embryos, and accidental Deſtruction of Plants and Animals, before they come to full Maturity, as an Imprudence in the Author of Nature, be not the effect of Prejudice contracted by our Familiarity with impotent and ſaving Mortals. In Man indeed a thrifty Management of thoſe Things, which he cannot procure without much Pains and Induſtry, may be eſteemed Wiſdom. But we muſt not imagine, that the inexplicably fine Machine of an Animal or Vegetable, coſts the great CREATOR any more Pains or Trouble in its Production than a Pebble doth: nothing being more evident, than that an omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce every thing by a mere Fiat or Act of his Will. Hence it is plain, that the ſplendid Profuſion of natural Things ſhould not be interpreted, Weakneſs or Prodigality in the Agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an Argument of the Riches of his Power.

CLIII. As for the mixture of Pain or Uneaſineſs which is in the World, purſuant to the general Laws of Nature, and the Actions of finite imperfect Spirits: This, in the State we are in at preſent, is indiſpenſibly neceſſary to our well-being. But our Proſpects are too narrow: We take, for Inſtance, the Idea of ſome one particular Pain into our Thoughts, and account it Evil; whereas if we enlarge our View, ſo as to comprehend the various Ends, Connexions, and Dependencies of Things, on what Occaſions and in what Proportions we are affected with Pain and Pleaſure, the Nature of humane Freedom, and the Deſign with which we are put into the World; we ſhall be forced to acknowledge that thoſe particular Things, which conſidered in themſelves appear to be Evil, have the Nature of Good, when conſidered as linked with the whole Syſteme of Beings.

CLIV. From what hath been ſaid it will be manifeſt to any conſidering Perſon, that it is merely for want of Attention and Comprehenſiveneſs of Mind, that there are any Favourers of Atheiſm or the Manichean Hereſy to be found. Little and unreflecting Souls may indeed burleſque the Works of Providence, the Beauty and Order whereof they have not Capacity, or will not be at the Pains to comprehend. But thoſe who are Maſters of any Juſtneſs and Extent of Thought, and are withal uſed to reflect, can never ſufficiently admire the divine Traces of Wiſdom and Goodneſs that ſhine throughout the Oeconomy of Nature. But what Truth is there which ſhineth ſo ſtrongly on the Mind, that by an Averſion of Thought, a wilful ſhutting of the Eyes, we may not eſcape ſeeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the generality of Men, who are ever intent on Buſineſs or Pleaſure, and little uſed to fix or open the Eye of their Mind, ſhould not have all that Conviction and Evidence of the Being of GOD, which might be expected in reaſonable Creatures?

CLV. We ſhould rather wonder, that Men can be found ſo ſtupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they ſhould be unconvinced of ſuch an evident and momentous Truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of Parts and Leiſure, who live in Chriſtian Countries, are merely through a ſupine and dreadful Negligence ſunk into a ſort of Atheiſm. Since it is downright impoſſible, that a Soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough Senſe of the Omnipreſence, Holineſs, and Juſtice of that Almighty Spirit, ſhould perſiſt in a remorſeleſs Violation of his Laws. We ought therefore earneſtly to meditate and dwell on thoſe important Points; that ſo we may attain Conviction without all Scruple, that the Eyes of the LORD are in every place beholding the Evil and the Good; that he is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us Bread to eat, and Raiment to put on; that he is preſent and conſcious to our innermoſt Thoughts; and that we have a moſt abſolute and immediate dependence on him. A clear View of which great Truths cannot chooſe but fill our Hearts with an awful Circumſpection and holy Fear, which is the ſtrongeſt Incentive to Virtue, and the beſt Guard againſt Vice.

CLVI. For after all, what deſerves the firſt place in our Studies, is the Conſideration of GOD, and our Duty; which to promote, as it was the main drift and deſign of my Labours, ſo ſhall I eſteem them altogether uſeleſs and ineffectual, if by what I have ſaid I cannot inſpire my Readers with a pious Senſe of the Preſence of GOD: And having ſhewn the Falſeneſs or Vanity of thoſe barren Speculations, which make the chief Employment of learned Men, the better diſpoſe them to reverence and embrace the ſalutary Truths of the GOSPEL, which to know and to practiſe is the higheſt Perfection of humane Nature.